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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
f CT 7
Potpourri
In place of our usual extended commentary on a
particular topic, we offer this month a series of abbreviated observations on matters of current interest.
We are, of course, thereby forearmed against charges
of superficiality.
• If you can't say something nice, our mothers all
told us, say nothing at all. It is a temptation to end any
comment on the new Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America (ELCA) just there. But that seems excessively
dismissive and curmudgeonly. So what can be said that
violates neither the rule of charity nor the requirements of honesty?
Not much at all, though we deeply wish that were
not the case. Ever since the Commission for a New Lutheran Church (CNLC) began its deliberations several
years ago, the great fear among confessional Lutherans of a catholic bent has been that the new church
would become just another addition to the Protestant
mainline. The deliberations of the CNLC did little to
allay that fear.
If there is any distinct institutional purpose for
Lutheranism on the denominational spectrum, it is as
a body that has escaped fundamentalism without stumbling into liberalism. Yet the CNLC, particularly in its
absurd system of quotas (instead of catholicity we get
"inclusiveness") and its hopelessly trendy plan for
theological education (see the penetrating analysis by
Leonard Klein in the June 6, 1986 edition of Forum
Letter), has too often made itself indistinguishable from
any random body in the National Council of Churches. It has been governed, in summary terms, too little
by confessional theology, too much by tendentious
sociology. (For the ~epressing details, consult the recent numbers of dialog and Forum Letter.) Lutheran
theology has in recent years been going through an
exciting process of reinvigoration. Why has so little of
that renewal been evident in the CNLC's deliberations?
And then there is Missouri. The best that can be
said for the recent LCMS convention in Indianapolis
is that it managed narrowly to fend off a takeover by
the right-wing fanatics. A blessing, no doubt, but a
sadly small one. Missouri has resisted the lures of
liberalism, but it remains worlds removed from a
genuinely evangelical and catholic perspective.
This lament for a lost--or at least currently elusive-Lutheran center is not offered in a flippant or
October, 1986
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superior mood. There are large numbers of men and
women in both Missouri and the proposed ELCA for
whose theology and piety we have the greatest respect
and admiration. We only wish that their influence
were more manifest than is currently the case.
We could well be wrong in our pessimism. We hope
we are. In any case we cling, as Christians must, to
trust in the Lord who has promised that he will not
forsake his church.
• There have by now been so many conflicting
analyses of the effects of the new Tax Reform Bill that
most of us are thoroughly confused. Does it help the
rich at the expense of the middle class? Will its higher
rates on business inhibit economic growth? Will it tend
to diminish charitable giving?
We don't pretend to know the definitive answers to
these questions. Different economists make different
predictions, and the great majority of us who are not
economists shrug our shoulders and hope for the best.
Yet in all the confusion one thing is clear. The bill
will remove some six million of the working poor from
the tax rolls. Many of them will thereby edge above
the poverty line. That makes the bill, whatever else it
is, a genuine reform measure. And therefore worthy
of support.
• A recent contributor to National Review (Ronald
Reagan's favorite magazine) argues that the term neoconservative should be retired. Those called neoconservatives, he suggests, are simply people who used to be
liberal and are now conservative. In this view, Irving
Kristol and Norman Podhoretz are not clearly distinguishable from the general run of conservative intellectuals, and Commentary offers not an alternative to
National Review but an elaboration of it.
We wish there were less evidence for this proposition than there is. For a variety of reasons, the range
between conservatism and neoconservatism has been
considerably narrowed, and the differences that remain often get glossed over. Politics is about coalitions,
ideas about distinctions, and on the con/neocon frontier politics has taken precedence. The recent indignant complaints among some old-line conservatives
that the neocons have invaded the vineyard (and run
off with the patronage) testify to the direction of
events. As for the complaints themselves-which feature arguments that neocons bear ideologically fraudulent credentials-they increasingly bring to mind
Freud's remarks concerning the narcissism of small
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differences.
There was a time, and not so long ago, when clear
lines of demarcation existed. Neoconservatives thought
the Great Society a mistake but did not thereby reject
the welfare state; they were firm anti-Communists
but they remembered that William Buckley and his
friends had supported Joe McCarthy and had never
subsequently repudiated that support. Those were
important differences then; they should remain so
now.
Perhaps we exaggerate both the political/intellectual
trend and the difference it makes. There is always the
danger in ideological politics of excessive concern for
doctrinal purity. But there is also the danger that in
the effort to influence the course of events, the political intellectual might forget that his primary duty,
Marx to the contrary notwithstanding, is not to change
the world but to understand and evaluate it with all
the precision and care for distinctions that he can
muster-and let the politics take care of itself.
• The oddest thing about the Senate debate over
the Supreme Court confirmations of William Rehnquist
and Antonin Scalia was the vote that concluded it. The
Senate approved Scalia 98-0, but the vote confirming
Rehnquist as Chief Justice was only 65-33. The disparity in the margins indicates that the Senate never did
get the debate-or the issues-in proper focus.
Most Senators continue to operate-at least officially-on the traditional assumption that opposition to
Supreme Court nominees can only be justified on
grounds of ethics or technical competence, not judicial
philosophy. Since no one could doubt Rehnquist's
competence or intelligence, liberals had to search desperately for some ethical flaw or series of flaws in his
career that would disqualify him. It would have been
better if the liberals had kept the emphasis instead on
substantive questions of jurisprudence, which is where,
in fact, most of their essential opposition to Rehnquist
originated.
Instead they engaged in a fruitless and often unfair
attempt to unearth the "smoking gun" that would
prove the nominee ethically unfit for his position.
They failed in that, but they dredged up enough
vaguely unsavory material to leave Rehnquist's reputation under a mild cloud. He deserved better than that
and the American people deserved a more coherent
discussion of the issues at stake.
One wishes that Rehnquist's Senatorial opponents
had been truer to their deepest instincts. The real
issue had to do not with Rehnquist's ethics but with his
judicial philosophy. He is a champion of judicial restraint, and he is a thoughtful and incisive critic of the
judicial activism that has become the hallmark of lib4

era! jurisprudence. Thus most of the talk concerning
his supposed "insensitivity" to women and minorities
came down to his opposition to Roe v. Wade and to affirmative action quotas, and in both cases his opposition is rooted in his constitutional philosophy.
In this kind of situation, liberals should display
more than they have the courage of their convictions.
It is true that judges should not base their decisions on
ideological preferences (the proper judicial opposition
to Roe v. Wade is not that it is pro-choice but that it
is bad law), but it is also true that judicial philosophies
have policy implications. The way that Justice Rehnquist reads the Constitution affects the way he rules on
issues like abortion and affirmative action. We happen
to agree with his philosophy of judicial restraint, but
we also think that those who think otherwise should
not apologize for opposing him on that basis alone. It
is certainly better that they be open in the reasons for
their opposition than that they pretend they are talking about ethics when they are actually talking about
theories of jurisprudence.

Had the Senate debate on Rehnquist
and Scalia confronted the real issues,
the votes on their confirmations
would have been far more similar than
they were. Scalia is the same kind
of judicial conservative as Rehnquist.
Had the Senate debate on Rehnquist and Scalia confronted the real issues, the votes on their confirmations would have been far more similar than they
were. Scalia is the same kind of judicial conservative
that Rehnquist is, and it simply made no sense that he
should be confirmed unanimously when Rehnquist
drew so much opposition.
It need not have turned out that way. Some liberal
Senators began the debate by indicating they would
confront the essential question of judicial philosophy.
Instead they gave in to political convenience and
began to posture about Rehnquist's character. In the
end, the debate degenerated into irrelevance and bad
faith, and we were all the losers.
• For all those disapproving of any or all of the
above, we offer this recent description of the
editorialist's. art: "Editorial writers are people who
come down from the hills after the battle is over and
shoot the wounded." That of course is vicious and unfair. If it were not so accurate, we would be deeply of~~.
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Renu Juneja

BEYOND GENDER AND RACE
The Celebration of Difference

(Editor's Note: Last February, the Valparaiso University
chapter of Mortar Board, the national student honor society,
sponsored a Last Lecture series. Participants were asked to
prepare a lecture as if it were to be the last they would ever
present. This is the third of those essays to be published in
The Cresset. Frederick A. Niedner, Jr.'s appeared last
April, Gail McGrew Eifrig's in September.)

To walk into my son's room is to enter another
world. Half-human and half-insect figures hang
around a plastic castle shaped like a hive. Robots capable of swift transformation into space-age transport
line a wall, and creatures in weird shapes, sizes, and
colors lurk under the bed, in closets, and behind the
door.
To me, some of these odd shapes appear genuinely
ugly and I have marvelled at his affection for them.
He does not share my confusion, and must, I am sure,
be puzzled by my aesthetic prejudices. For him, the
"bad guys" are ugly and the "good guys" are strangely
attractive-the inner shape of the being and not the
outer shape determines beauty. I find his ability to go
beyond shape, color, and texture rather comforting.
And I have wondered if his generation, delighting in
the cutely monstrous extra-terrestrial, will grow up
free of the biases concerning race and color that so
plague our world. So perhaps my fantasy of a world
no longer fearful of what is different and alien will, in
some definite future, be transformed into reality.
My son's world does not provide similar assurances
on the issue of gender. Despite some very real changes
in consciousness that we have witnessed over the last
two decades, I still see the children in my neighbor-

Renu Juneja teaches English at Valparaiso University. She
has published widely in a variety of professional journals.
Her most recent contribution to The Cresset, "The Gandhian Paradox: Religion and Nonviolence in Modern India,"
appeared in February, 1985.
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hood play almost exclusively with others of the same
sex. Even at six, my son is acutely conscious of gender
differences, which is as it should be. That at this age
he should prefer the company of boys also seems natural enough.
But his swiftly developing penchant for generalizing
on activities, personalities, and attitudes on the basis of
gender I find rather disturbing. All my efforts to mold
his consciousness seem puny compared to the greater
force of cultural prejudices that he imbibes almost unconsciously. So he balks at taking dancing lessons, has
strong preference for what he perceives to be boyish
colors, and has recently confided to me that girls scare
too easily. And I have wondered if even his generation
will be bound by gender stereotyping that so plagues
the world. So perhaps my fantasy of a world free of
the limitations imposed by sexual stereotypes will remain j u st that-a fantasy to be fulfilled only in the
realms of science fiction.
Yet my images of such a future, fed undoubtedly by
feminist science fiction like Leguin's The Left Hand of
Darkness, are hard to surrender. Leguin's novel creates
a world truly beyond gender, a race of androgynous
humans capable of nurturing in each individual those
d ualities or oppositions our world labels feminine or
masculine. T he odd biology of these people makes
them acquire either male or female sexual characteristics during their sexually active phase-in response to
a partner who is then stimulated into the opposite
gender configuration. More interestingly, to have been
a female during one sexual cycle, even to have borne
a child, does not preclude acquiring male attributes
next time around. The same individual has been both
male and female, mother and father, during a life
time.
What interests Leguin, and her readers who have
been inspired by the promise such a vision offers, are
the social and psychological consequences of such a biology. Since descent is reckoned from the mother, the
parent in the flesh, concepts like legitimacy or bastardy of birth become meaningless. Since everyone
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can, literally, do anything, no occupation is defined in
terms of gender. Since no one part of the race is tied
down to child bearing or rearing, the burdens and
privileges of parenting are shared equally. Since there
are no preconceived divisions of human attributes
based on gender, there are also no stereotypical expectations of behavior based on sex. Strangely, Leguin informs us, there is no rape and has been no war on this
planet.
The power of Leguin's vision moves us beyond the
biologically inconceivable to the culturally conceivable.
While true androgyny is neither possible nor perhaps
desirable, we may still look forward to a world where
gender is no longer an overwhelming force in shaping
identity, social role, or emotional and intellectual
achievements. I have shared these visions in order to
reflect on their relevance to college education. A more
specific formulation of my concerns would be: what
could we as educators do to stimulate in young minds
this capacity I so cherish, a capacity to free oneself
from biases of a particular sex or culture?
To construct my response to this question I begin by
extrapolating from personal experience. I am aware of
the dangers of such a strategy. To elevate the individual to the general may be to build a hollow argument. Also, there may be something stereotypically
feminine about such a confessional mode, although
women's preoccupations with the particular and the
personal are not hard to explain. For most of us
women, the world is relatively circumscribed. And as
we struggle with self-definition and self-actualization,
we often find so little that is relevant to our needs in
the public culture that we must of necessity use the
personal and the private.
There is, perhaps, even a greater justification for
my chosen strategy. The premise of a "last lecture" implies that we reflect on where we are and how we have
come there. We must consciously appraise our intellectual history if we are to distill from it anything
genuine and true and worth sharing with others. In
Keatsian terms, we must have felt it on our pulses,
along our sinews and nerves, for "nothing ever becomes real till it is experienced." And by that neither
Keats nor I imply a vulgar sensationalism . The experiences of the mind and the imagination also have a
palpable reality.
My intellectual history, then, viewed from the vantage point of middle life in middle America, delineates
a process for which I can claim some relevance for our
concerns here although no absolute validity. To begin
with myself is to begin with a sense of difference. I am
a woman and I am non-white. To be a woman in a
world where over half the population shares your gender ·should hardly qualify one for this acute sense of
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difference. Yet as far back as my memory can travel,
my consciousness of who I was or what I could be
seemed inextricably linked with what I was not and
what I could not be-a boy and a man.
For young college students today, the world is very
different from the overwhelmingly patriarchal culture
of my childhood. At least it seems different, but I suspect that even today, a young woman's fledgling definitions of self-more so than a young man's-begin
with this sense of her gender even as she sets out to
negate or deny the difference. I don't think I need to
explain my persistent sense of my difference as a nonwhite at Valparaiso University. My focus here is largely
on this consciousness of difference, and what one does
with it. The roots of this sense of difference, as it
turns out for me, are gender and race. In a sense, the
causes-gender and race-are irrelevant.

While true androgyny is neither
possible nor perhaps desirable, we
may still look forward to a world
where gender is no longer an
overwhelming force in shaping
identify, social role, or emotional
and intellectual achievements.
Having reflected briefly on issues of gender and
race, we can now expand our perspective to include
more universal concerns. What remain of fundamental
importance are, after all , not the causes of this sense
of difference but its effects-both on me and my particular audience here: students and colleagues. That is,
what interests me is not what causes my sense of difference but how I deal with it, and that also only as
a springboard for reflection on how we at Valparaiso
University should deal with it.
The answer is simple enough although somewhat
enigmatic: we must celebrate difference. To do this is
to distinguish ourselves as mature, fully individuated
human beings-a cherished goal for all liberal education. Current psychology informs us that for all of us,
both genders and all races, the process of individuation involves painful recognition of separation and difference from the other. According to Margaret
Mahler, for instance, the formation of identity begins
with a separation of child from the original symbiotic
unity with the mother. Early development demands
that the child must learn to accept that the world is
not magically responsive to his or her urgent demands. This separation-individuation process is a lifelong one and is often accompanied by recurring
The Cresset

traumas of separation. I would like to slightly rephrase
Mahler by saying that these recurring traumas are precipitated when the distinctiveness, the separateness,
the difference of the other, or others, impinges acutely
on our consciousness. And how we respond to these
crises is, indeed, a measure of our maturity.
There are several possible responses: We can, for instance, deny the difference by ignoring or avoiding it,
by deliberately retreating into a comforting and familiar sameness. If going to a lecture by Professor X produces this sense of disjunction, let us not go to a lecture by Professor X. In fact, let's avoid anyone, at least
at the level of real interaction, who thinks, feels, or
even looks like Professor X. Let's share our intimate
selves with people who think like us, feel like us, and
look like us.
Another possible response that we have probably
witnessed is to deny validity to the other and the difference by building fantasies of our superiority. That
is, we can admit that the different exists but declare
it to be inferior and therefore of less value, even, ultimately, valueless. It would be wrong to assume that
things that are different are necessarily of equal value.
When dealing with the different we should not abandon our ability to discriminate and assign merit. The
words I have used are "fantasies of superiority." We
need to be able to sift prejudice from fact. Finally,
there is the response that I proposed at the beginning
-we can celebrate the difference. I have not
suggested that we celebrate the different, although
that may be part of the process, but only that we
cherish the difference.
To do this is more than to accept. The process of
mere acceptance works something like this: You think
differently from me, but that is all right. You to your
own beliefs and I to mine. I see such acceptance as a
minimal step forward, if that. Actually, I think this too
is a form of regression. It is a perfectly predictable response in our difficult but permissive world, but it is
a weak response nevertheless. What it lacks is connections and relationships with the other. It leads not to
an affirmation but to an attrition of values, generating
the kind of relativism that borders on vacuum and
comes suspiciously close to nihilism.
"Only Connect," says E.M. Forster's epigraph to
Howards End, and so raises the questions--connect
what with what and connect how? The things to be
connected are particular to the situations Forster
creates in the novel. My brief description of Forster's
novel which follows provides the necessary context to
free us to use Forster in our deliberations on how to
connect. The novel centers on a conflict of values that
could be variously described: between social classes,
between the masculine and the feminine, between the
October, 1986

country and the city, between tradition and modernism. We could, for our purposes, substitute other
terms, as long as we recognize that these oppositional
counters embody values, ways of life, attitudes that divide humanity, making people different from, even
alien to, · each other.
Within the novel, at the heart of the opposition are
two families-the Schlegels and the Wilcoxes. The
Schlegel sisters-Margaret and Helen-embody sensitivity of taste and feeling, affirmation of personal relationships-a high culture. The Wilcoxes are the
philistine; they represent the commercialism and the
modern progressivism of new wealth. Through a
series of complex developments that need not concern
us here, Margaret marries Henry Wilcox, a marriage
of which Helen disapproves. She disapproves because
one cannot connect with the Wilcoxes, only battle
them. And battle them she does, rather ineffectually as
it happens, by championing a poor, lower-class young
man named Leonard Bast. Though he is not of their
class, and is in many ways very alien to them, Bast has
been earlier befriended by the two sisters and subsequently, and unintentionally, harmed through them.
In a casual conversation, Henry Wilcox predicts that
the bank in which Bast is a petty clerk is financially
unsound and headed for trouble. The sisters thereupon counsel Bast to find another job, which he does
at a greatly reduced salary, only to find himself without a job when this new concern, now in financial
trouble, retrenches by firing the new employees. The
old bank continues to thrive but Leonard Bast is completely ruined-totally impoverished, starving, and
without any future prospects either. Henry Wilcox was
wrong in his prediction, but he refuses to accept responsibility for the ruin of the young man and refuses
to make any reparation.
Helen, driven by her passion for justice and her
guilt, tries first to shame Henry, and failing there, she
tries in some ways to connect with Bast. She seduces
him. As a member of the lower class, Bast does represent the other and the different for Helen, for class
distinctions in England seem almost more impenetrable than race distinctions in the U.S. For me, and I
think even for Forster, the issue is not whether these
two classes can or cannot connect meaningfully, but
rather how this connection is to be made. Forster
makes it clear that the seduction is the wrong way to
connect. Forster is not, of course, passing any judgment on Helen's sexual immorality; he is passing judgment on her motives. To Helen, Bast is not an individual but an embodiment of an idea. And Helen is
not connecting with Bast; she is using him.
The climax of the novel finds Helen in England
after a long interval, greatly pregnant with Bast's
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child. She is now seeking to connect with her sister by
spending a night with her at Howards End, a house that
belongs to Henry but a house whose spiritual ownership remains in dispute through the novel. For Henry,
Helen's pregnancy is a scandal, and he will not allow
her to be there. He must save Margaret from Helen.
Margaret, in turn, is forced to choose. She had earlier
chosen to connect with Wilcox, however difficult the
connection seemed and has been. She had done so because she sensed, Forster implies, the danger of believing too ardently in the division of their worlds-the
Wilcox world and the Schlegel world: "Only connect!
That was the whole of the sermon. Only connect the
prose and the passion and both will be exalted, and
human love will be seen at its height. Live in fragments no longer. Only connect, and the beast and the
monk, robbed of the isolation that is life to either, will
die."
Forster has endorsed this as tolerance born of a
greater, more basic self-certainty than Helen's. Margaret, unlike Helen, has been able to see Henry as
something more than the embodiment of an idea. She
has, however, not stopped discriminating. She does so
in this climactic scene when she condemns Henry's
moral blindness-his inability to see the connection between his own sin and Helen's, between his responsibilities to Margaret and hers to her sister. There is,
as Margaret recognizes, a difference between judging
and being judgmental: "It is those that cannot connect
who hasten to cast the first stone."
What Forster has implied about how to connect can
clarify my notion of cherishing differences. Obviously,
to cherish difference is not to stop discriminating or
even judging. Rather one continues to respond critically but does so with integrity and intelligence. It may
be absolutely in order to say that what is different is
also wrong. But to do so, one must at least go beyond
prejudice and understand the different by seeking to
connect. This also requires the ability to go beyond
stereotypes, the ability, that is, not to pass judgment
on the Wilcoxes in a lump. To connect is to be fully
aware of the complexities of the situation.
Also, just as one must go beyond mere prejudice
and mere acceptance, one must also go beyond mere
use. You use what is different when you largely concern yourself with how the different and the other
contribute to your inner needs. As, for instance, I
sometimes think Valparaiso University uses me. A very
dear, wise, and sensitive friend said to me last week,
"We need you, Renu, to keep us honest." I am absolutely sure that he did not mean the remark as I could
hear it. But let me respond to the remark as I could
have heard it. To affirm my difference as a value because it keeps you honest is a virtue, my friend, but
8

it is not enough. Nor does the insufficiency of the response have to do with any implied neglect of my
needs. These should matter but for the moment they
are also irrelevant. And to be fully honest, I will also
admit that I have used Valparaiso for my needs, and
been guilty of far greater sins-stereotyping and passing judgment on stereotypes.
The issue is, after all, how we should connect. I
would submit that you engage with the different and
the other not only to become a better reader of your
story-though that indeed is a valuable fringe benefit-you do so to become a better reader of all
stories. As Plato said of his philosopher, one must become "a lover not of a part of wisdom only, but the
whole."
These attitudes that now furnish the house of my
mind, whose validity I so unashamedly assert, I have
acquired as I have implied earlier through personal
experience. As you well know, I am an Indian by birth
and some cultural dispositions. But I also teach English literature. There seems to be a contradiction inherent in the situation, although such a curious disjunction is, I suppose, fairly typical of a certain class
and generation of post-colonial people-people like
me who grew up uneasy inheritors of a dual tradition,
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denied.both the security and the entrapment of ethnocentricity. The drama of my evolution is fueled by
shifting loyalties, frequent redefinitions of self and
purpose, and occasional triumphs when the double vision can be celebrated for its richness and not denied
for its divisiveness. These triumphs of diversity I wish
to nurture in myself and in students.
The dichotomies of my childhood are easily visualized. Imagine attempting to shape yourself to
Christian ideals during school hours at a British public
school and "lapsing" into Hindu modes for the rest of
the day. Or molding your conduct according to two
conflicting codes of behavior: one that encourages vigorous self-expression, assertion of individuality, and
originality in thinking; the other which prizes self-restraint and self-denial, submersion into community,
and deference to tradition. Since authorities at home
and at school remained reluctant to acknowledge the
validity of the other, we children survived by compartmentalizing experience, by changing colors like a
chameleon as we shifted environments. But we knew
even then that we were being thrust forward into
choice, that initially, at least, forging selfhood might
demand alignment.
One such choice, the study of English literature,
while giving direction to the process of self-discovery,
produced its own perplexities. At the most basic level,
how does one apprehend images and actions for which
one has no referents in personal experience? I remember, for instance, my earliest encounter with a
particularly engaging poem of Gerard Manley Hopkins, "Spring and Fall." Margaret, the young child addressed in the poem, is grieving "over Goldengrove
unleaving" and the poet admonishes her that as she
grows older she will fail to sigh "though worlds of
wanwood leafmeal lie." All explanation about fall, even
pictures, seemed inadequate to make available the rich
associations of a season that did not exist in my subtropical world. At other levels, the problem was more
complex: how does one learn to possess an aesthetic
informed by cultural values different from one's own?
How? With great difficulty and much effort. But
after all the process is not impossible or I would not
be here. I have been able to survive as a teacher of
English as well as others not so handicapped, have
been able to unravel literary texts with equal proficiency as those who had deeper roots in this culture.
Understandably, my initial effort was directed at assimilation. But having proved myself, I have also been
able to overcome insecurities that persisted. I am
ready now to cultivate my difference as a source of
strength. I am no longer trapped in issues of gender
and race; I can move in them and beyond them.
What relevance does my experience hold for stuOctober, 1986

dents at Valparaiso University? Their situation seems
the very reverse of mine. A system of shared symbols
holds this society together, a shared vocabulary makes
understanding easy. In so far as culture provides a secure sense of identity, my students have access to their
culture and hence a stable self. Their inheritance is secure whether they have fully possessed it or not. This
is a place of kindred spirits who have, to some measure, deliberately chosen to stay with their own kind.
And while we are all members of a larger community, an immigrant nation that cherishes diversity and
ethnicity, even this vision of America emphasizes
merging and adapting, blending the many into one:
We are different and yet we are one; we have freedom
to remain individuals yet we "melt" into each other.
The sense of difference is muted down to quirks of
clothing, habits of speech, and ethnicity in food. The
similarities encompass a shared worldview and relatively compatible value systems.

Americans are different and yet
are one; we have freedom to remain
individuals yet we "melt" into
each other. The sense of difference
is muted down to quirks of
clothing, habits of speech, and
ethnicity in food.
Paradoxically, even this vision welcoming diversity is
more a myth to inspire than a description of actualities. The real world, for one, is much larger than
America. It is pluralistic as it is interdisciplinary. It will
not allow us to forget gender and race. It will ask that
we deal with the different and the other. Have we prepared our students for that world? Have we prepared
them to handle traumas generated from encounters
with the different and the conflicting that they will
most likely encounter?
In academic circles, there is much talk today of how
we should be preparing our students. Three highpowered reports have come out in the past year to address the apparent crisis in liberal education. We are
offered a host of panaceas. My favorite is the one proposed by William Bennett. He urges us to reclaim our
legacy by reading a series of important, original texts.
In Bennett's canon of great books we meet a great
world of white men, except for Jane Austen, George
Eliot, and Martin Luther King. Such canons embody
hidden ideological premises, as perhaps do our book
lists and courses here at Valparaiso University. How
well, then, have we prepared our students?
9

I think, in some small measure and despite our limitations, we have tried. In some of our general education courses, for instance, we have sought to embed an
awareness of the historicity and mutability of cultural
paradigms. As we move from the classical to the modern age, the literature of a period defines itself in relationships of difference. My students in my introductory literature courses bring to class the conviction that
the world of literature exists separate from their "real"
world. One of my first endeavors is to persuade them
that while the art world seems to exist untouched by
and independent of them, the converse is not true.
Things in art move us emotionally, move us as practical agents do.
To take an example, while we cannot dissuade
Othello from killing Desdemona, at the same time we
are disturbed by Desdemona's murder much as we
would be by the murder of an innocent woman in the
. actual world. This shows that characters in a play have
the capacity to induce in us real-life emotions. My next
step is to establish that our response to a literary work
includes different elements such as our capacities to
'think, to act, a~d to act morally. That is, our response
comprehends our total value system. If I achieve this
much, I have, at the very least, made my students reflect consciously on their values.
To some degree, then, we can use our general education courses even as they exist today to cultivate a
pedagogy that sensitizes students to difference. To
study a text within its historical context is to become
· aware that people do not live in a vacuum , just as artists do not create in a vacuum. Artists and their characters must be viewed from within the totality of their
economic, social, and philosophical relations-just as
economic theorems, engineered artifacts, social doctrines, and philosophical theories must be viewed from
within the context of the people who produce them
and use them.
The Elizabethans were very different from us in
fo'o d, polity, and family relations. To achieve this understanding is much. Nevertheless, the capacity of the
past to dislocate the present is limited because the past ·
is essentially defeated by its deadness. Trapped in a
theory of progress, we need not engage in a real
dialogue. Then too, paradoxically, because this past is
subsumed within a living and familiar tradition, the
difference may not be radical enough. The surest way
of acquiring an awareness of the culture-specificity of
values must be for us to undertake a cross-cultural
dialogue with .a living tradition different from our
own.
What, then, should we be teaching and the students
be learning? Surely not just a canon that essentially
explores .·a common heritage and affirms a common
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culture. We must make room for courses, more so
than we have done , which focus on humanistic expressions of the different. As I see it, the clearest way to
achieve this goal is to institute a strong non-western
core at the very heart of liberal studies. If we do this,
we may not rid ourselves of our cultural baggage and,
perhaps, should not even try to , but we can at least become aware of its origins and limitations. To make the
unconscious conscious may be the first step towards
cherishing difference.
For education to be liberal, it must liberate people,
make them free .of limitations of personality and environment. And this is not achieved through mastering
a fixed body of knowledge. Nor is it achieved through
affirming a shared set of ethical and religious values.
What we should have cultivated in our students is an
attitude-a readiness to consider new things, a flexibility, an adaptability, and an openness. If we succeed in
doing that through ways I have suggested, we will
have taken our final step towards the celebration of
difference. And to achieve that is to achieve a kind of
everlasting grace. And what is this heretical grace?
When you celebrate difference you possess your world
tl
view instead of being possessed by it.

Running through New England
For three weeks, each October morning
Ends at water or dogs that excuse us
From another mile of this marathon
To learn coast, highway, the unrecorded pulse
Of endurance while the weather rehearses
For winter, once with sleet striking
Like the side stitch that flares and fades
And allows us to follow color south
Until the rain that takes the last leaves
From our trees takes us upstairs
Where we will stand, not thoughtful
About the end of October, light going out
All over the property we are selling,
Lost, after this run, in tracing
The ceiling's stains like buyers,
Measuring changes the easy way,
So altered ourselves neither of us
Will put our hands on the other,
Knowing whatever we've done, we are leaving.

Gary Fincke
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John H. Timmerman

TRAIN OF ROBES, PLUME OF FEATHERS
Rhetoric in the Religious Publishing House

Look at this first sentence very carefully! It doesn't
say anything in particular, but, in the editorial offices
of many modern religious publishing houses, it comprises the most important sentence of this essay. It has
enticed you to read this far, and in the abashedly
pragmatic jargon which has come to dominate those
houses, that first sentence is called a "hook."
The hook isn't necessarily expected to mean anything; indeed, its value lies in a certain degree of ambiguity which permits the reader to invest it with whatever meaning is desired. The hook does in publishing
what it also does in fishing. It catches prey. A good
hook, however ambiguous, has specific qualities. Typically the verb is in the imperative or interrogative
mood. The hook is short, usually ten words or less.
Exclamation marks are used even with declarative sentences.
The hook captures reader attention, then, but it also
directs reader attention. Look where? At this first sentence. Or sentences in general. Rhetoric is the subject
matter of this essay, sentences and how good writers
craft them and how religious publishing houses
simplify them. Yes, look at that first sentence carefully; you'll see variations of it in nearly every "mass
market" book coming off the presses today, for the
hook is one standard but necessary technique that an
author needs to master in order to survive in modern
religious publishing. It applies whether one is writing
about marriage ("When was the last time you and your
marriage partner really talked?"), about psychology
("You're not alone!"), about ... just about anything.
But the hook is just the start of something larger
and more insidious in what may be called "the programmed prose" of modern religious publishers. "Pro-
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grammed" is the correct adjective, for much of the
prose is computer calibrated. This may be done overtly by computer programs that literally quantify prose
patterns to certain reading levels. By considering average lengths of syllables per word, words per sentence,
sentences per paragraph, and so on, the program
calibrates to an ideal mass-market prose level, somewhere around a ninth-grade reading level. Even if
such a program is not used, however, the pattern of
modern religious prose clearly falls into the scheme.

By considering average lengths of
syllables per word, words per
sentence, and sentences per paragraph,
the publisher's computer program
calibrates to an ideal mass-market
prose level, somewhere around a
ninth-grade reading level.
Observe these characteristics. First, the governing
decision of editorial boards is seldom the intrinsic
quality of the manuscript alone, but ·whether it will
sell. Twenty years ago, if an author received a manuscript rejection it would likely have a note about "not
fitting the standards of the press." Ten years ago, the
note might have said something about it "not fitting
into the publishing schedule," or "present needs."
Today such a rejection letter will state unequivocally
and unapologetically, "It won't sell." Occasionally a
conscience-stricken editor will append a scrawled note,
"This is really beautifully written. Hope you find a
publisher." The first question, then, is not whether the
work is worthy, but whether it will sell. And from that
first question related questions arise.
The next such will be this. If the co·ncept might sell,
or as sometimes stated, "It meets an audience need,"
how can it be "packaged" to make sure it gets in the
hands of the audience? Packaging begins with an edi11

tor who, whether programmed or not, has very specific if mechanical directions. Some of these directions
are as follows. The prose must be in "attention span"
units, which means "brief." A now standard question
on any reader's report form (used when a house solicits the opinion of an outside reader with some expertise in the subject matter) is this: "Can this manuscript be shortened?" This for two reasons: l) the fact
that pages cost money, 2) the belief that readers can't
handle length. The standard book size now is approximately 60,000 words. A decade ago it was twice that.
The editor's task, then, is to strip back at all levels: the
book as a whole , chapters, paragraphs, sentences. Like
viewing a book through a reversed telescope, everything shrinks and the edges get lost.
At those· edges lie two things: rhetorical techniques
once valued for intrinsic mastery over the English language-techniques such as cumulative, periodic, or
compound-complex structures which embellish sentences (and elaborate ideas), and figurative writing.
The audience, so the editors believe, insists upon sentence "nuggets" of meaning, and becomes confused by
figurative language. The editor helps the writer say
what he or she means and say it briefly. Here one begins to notice that in the commercial approach to publishing, writing is not unlike commercial advertising,
selling ideas in neat little packages. But there is more.
The above represents prose packaging through
manuscript editing, and a second packaging is like
unto it-the packaging of the physical book a reader
will hold in hand (or, more likely, give as a Christmas
gift, the Christian seasons of Christmas and Lent now
being the most important timetable in publishing).
That package must be attractive. If there are to be illustrations, they are geared toward an audience, not
necessarily to content.
Many hours are spent discussing titles-usually without the author's advice-which will also serve as hooks .
Blurbs are solicited for book jackets from evangelical
celebrities. Brochures are prepared for salesmen and
book stores. In these brochures, the book may be
listed as a "header" with a half to full page promotion
at the front of the brochure, or as a "trailer" which
can run to a simple listing on the back pages. Usually
within a month ·o r two of the brochure release, from
which initial sales are made, the publisher will have a
clear idea how the book will sell, how long it will last,
whether it will be reprinted or killed. The best advertising, of course, is good sales, which explains the
glossy advertisements touting, instead of intrinsic quality or superb writing or meaningful thesis, "200,000
copies in print."
All of which is to say that modern religious publishmg is a business, a profit-making enterprise with a
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product crafted for a carefully targeted and potentially
lucrative audience. But what is lost in the process? The
result of writing with a hook in the heart is often a
rhetoric which is plainly hurting. What accounts for it?
Why have we come to this sadly pragmatic and commercial point, and from where have we come in getting there? Where did we lose the way?
I submit that the way we have lost is a valuable one,
for it is a way which honored the nobility of the English language, which understood rhetoric as a skill
and an art, and which saw as its journey intellectual
stimulation and as its end spiritual meaning. Never before have so may words gushed forth from the presses, such a veritable logorrhea, and so little rhetoric, so
little meaning.

Today the Christian writer walks a
tightrope pegged down at one end
by the unintelligible scramble of
bureaucratese and at the other end
by Dick and Jane watching Spot
run. At either end seems to lie
safety: mystification or mundanity.

Today the Christian writer walks a tightrope pegged
down at one end by the unintelligible scramble of bureaucratese and at the other end by Dick and ] ane
watching Spot run . At either end seems to lie safety.
Mystification at one pole; mundanity at the other. And
how does the writer strike a balance where not mystification but mystery-that mystery of human nature
which is also spiritual nature-is articulated clearly and
powerfully so that the masses are transformed into individuals seeking and finding the truth of their own
spiritual mysteries?
To fully understand and to fully appreciate just
where the modern religious press is today, one must
consider the point from which it has departed, a norm
of aesthetic and rhetorical excellence from which the
modern press has willfully tumbled. The norm that
has governed publishing excellence may be understood from two points of view, the one being a basis
of aesthetic excellence, the notion of noble thoughts in
an equally noble style, and the second being a basis for
biblical, Christian excellence which, while narrower in
applicability, has been no less profound in influence as
recently as a decade or two ago.
The standard norms of aesthetic excellence in history arose generally from the western tradition of literature and philosophy. In his Poetics, Artistotle delib-
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erately placed rhetorical excellence over spectacle, a
placement which Joseph Addison, among others, had
no difficulty agreeing with some 2,000 years later. In
The Spectator (No. 42, April 18, 1711), Addison wrote:
"In short, I would have our Conceptions rais'd by the
Dignity of Thought and Sublimity of Expression,
rather than by a Train of Robes or a Plume of Feathers." One could trace a general agreement in the western tradition of humane letters at some length. The
point would be the same: a high regard for the best
thoughts in the best rhetoric, a fittingness between
form and content.
Few people have addressed the issue from a Christian perspective as convincingly as Henry Zylstra in his
brief, but influential and superbly written book Testament of Vision (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans,
1958). The general argument of the work is that the
Christian testament must be worthy of the Christian
vision. The essay "A Vital Language" establishes
Zylstra's argument in regard to rhetoric:
Those who ignore the call for vitality in the diction, language, or style of our spoken and written word are, it
seems to me, making a mistake. What they have at the
back of their minds is probably something like this: the
important thing is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth . That, they feel, is the main thing, and they
go on to imply that the form in which that truth is uttered
is neither here nor there really . . . .
All the same, such separation of truth from statement,
of content from form, of idea from style, is a false and
fatal separation. The form is essential to the meaning, to
the understanding of it, and to the communication of it.
The thing we have to say is inert, dead , and incommunicable until it becomes significant, gets its sign, assumes
form. The truth, thought of as mere matter, is, if it be
without form, like the chaos of Genesis. It is void.

Based on this analogy to Genesis, Zylstra calls for a
vital form, one which brings ideas to life. And such
vital form, in Zylstra's estimation, establishes the
"genuineness" of Christian thinking and writing as opposed to the artifice of language as a commodity.
Zylstra extends his views to the publishing world as he
saw it at the time of the essay (1952):
The product may have a certain polish, a practised skill,
a rhythmical cadence, and a reasonably good facsimile of
style. But the thing remains, for want of genuineness, a
No-Thing, a piece of Ersatz. The soul is out of it.

Little seems to have changed for the better since
1952. Zylstra's argument still holds. It is a mark of sincerity, of genuineness, in Christian thinking to craft
the noblest rhetorical vessel to hold our thoughts. As
Solomon crafted the temple as an object of praise and
adoration, so ought we craft our books.
What, then, does this mean practically? Several
October, 1986

things.
Shakespeare said, "Give thy worst of thoughts the
worst of words." The challenge lies in the inversion of
his injunction: "Give thy best of thoughts the best of
words." Clothe the Word in words of royalty; give the
logos healthy flesh, not the diseased trappings of the
age, not the cloak of green for a ride to the bank.
To do so the modern religious house will have to
compromise, away from the dollar and back toward
the former . tradition in order to recapture the transformational and redemptive vision. In practical terms
this means, first, that the publisher will labor to improve the prose of all publications, and will publish
some works that are superbly written just as they are.
Editors will be as aware of rhetorical theory and practice as they now are of commercial theory and practice. Such publishers and editors will see their task as
transforming their readers as readers.

It is a mark of sincerity, of
genuineness, in Christian thinking
to craft the noblest rhetorical
vessel to hold our thoughts. As
Solomon crafted the temple as an
object of praise and adoration,
so ought we craft our books.
It will mean, secondly, that publishers will commit
themselves to publishing genuine works of literary art.
While my argument in this essay has to do largely with
the departure from rhetorical excellence in modern
religious publishing, an adjunct to that has been the
nearly complete forsaking of literary fine art. Evangelical Christianity has never fu lly assimilated the arts. It
has esteemed certain sanctioned authors of the pastLewis, Tolkien, MacDonald, and others-with perfervid reference. It has done next to nothing to encourage new authors, especially ones not willing to imitate
the established giants. The result has been a withdrawal of the Christian artist to a place where he and
she have nowhere to go; as if one, bearing a Godgiven vision, must turn the eyes inward and watch that
vision die.
The particular tragedy of the failure to bear a transforming and redemptive vision to the world-transforming by insisting upon the best of rhetoric and redemptive by giving the Word the best of words-is a
peculiar Christian solipsism. Publishers speak a language only the target audience understands, a language of "conversion experience," of theological fine-
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tunings of one's psychological life, of prayer
techniques for one's spiritual life, and so on. To an
unconverted audience, theology and prayer might be
so much gibberish unless put into a language which in
and of itself is compelling. The challenge to the religious house is to find meeting points of culture and
faith with an unconverted world, and one such meeting point is the noble tradition of rhetorical excellence.
But, finally, what kind of rhetoric? In place of the
formula, what? No better advice exists, I believe, than
that given by T. S. Eliot, himself an editor at Faber
and Faber for many years, in his masterpiece Little
Gidding. At two different points in that poem, Eliot
grapples with precisely the problem I am addressing
here, for already in the 1940s he spotted the drift toward rhetorical vacuity that lands in the slagheap of
formula language, and it disturbed him profoundly.
In the second movement of the poem, the narrator,
walking the pre-dawn, smoky streets of London during the firebombings of the early 1940s, has a vision
of a deceased poet who tutors him in his art-making.
The poet tells the narrator that "Last year's words belong to last year's language." Writers are responsible to
write clearly in the language of their age to people of
their age. Does this contradict what I have just been
arguing, that modern presses are nearly enslaved in
the rhetoric of our time? Eliot averts the misunderstanding. "Our concern was speech," says the poet,
"and speech impelled us I To purify the dialect of the
tribe." The lesson is to use the best of modern language in order to transform.
This point is expanded and specified in the final
section of the poem where Eliot envisions a rhetoric
partaking of a divine harmony. It is a living dance of
language in which every word and sentence "is at
home." The words should be neither "diffident nor ostentatious" (yes, rhetoric can become an end in itself),
but should be common, "without vulgarity"; precise
but "not pedantic." Every phrase, every sentence has
purpose: to illumine the divine harmony. This is the
language which Henry Zylstra called "genuine."
We see a difference, then, from pleasing as many
people as possible by being wholly inoffensive to
educating and transforming people by excellence of
rhetorical technique.
Having said these things, like Chaucer I want to
offer a retraction. My comments here apply to a trend
I see developing in modern religious publishing, and
it is a dangerous trend. However, I understand the
reasons behind it. The modern religious press is also
a victim of our time, sucked up in an economic
whirlpool in which dollars disappear at a phenomenal
rate. Publishers have a responsibility to their boards
and stockholders. They have to pay salaries and di14

vidends. Moreover, the government has been most unkind in its tax laws. Governmental computers understand publishing idealism no better than writers understand computer prose. Publishers and editors find
themselves between rock-like demands and hard economic facts. This is the rock and hard place of modern publishing everywhere; what is lost in between is
the old idealism of rhetorical excellence.
So caught, it is admirable that a few religious presses
have committed themselves to the transformational vision to produce works whose first criterion is excellence
and not sales figures, works that may not sell well, but
will endure as testaments of the Christian vision and
rhetorical excellence. I could readily name three or
four such presses, but will not, no more than I would
name the three or four worst offenders.
But in between that rock and hard place there must
be a meeting ground, a resurgence of idealism, a radical recommitment to transforming the Christian
reader by rhetorical excellence while providing the redemptive vision of Christian life. We shouldn't settle
for less, for we are much diminished by the loss. ~=

In the Fall
the world is at a terrible height.
The larches stand shocked
in the fall, streaming up.
The pines go up like darts.
Even the mountains tremble
and throw their fire.
Halfway up I lean back,
hands on the lichened wall.
The fire-men in the gulf
hold their nets and call . .

0 not for me, Lord,
not for me ...
I mean to go home climbing,
face to the solid rock,
heart for dear weight,
0 heavy heart.

Lionel Basney
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John Steven Paul

TO BE AN AUDIENCE
Reflections on Elitists, Patrons, Faddists, and Devotees

I don't know a more wonderful place to be after a
performance than O'Neal's Balloon. Its glassed-in cafe
affords a view across Columbus Avenue through Lincoln Center's marbled plaza all the way to the two
Marc Chagall tapestries glittering through windows of
the Metropolitan Opera. This national meeting place
for audiences of the dance, the theatre, the symphony,
and the opera functions as a cultural pump in the
heart of a city noted as often for its ugliness as for its
beauty. And if the sky is blue, the air warm, and the
leaves have come early to the many trees that line the
streets in between the high-rise residences, as they had
last May, one can believe that there is very much right
even with this corner of the world. Mayor Koch would
heartily recommend the experience, and so do I.
The last time I sat in O'Neal's was after a performance of John Guare's hilarious and disconcerting play
about the 1960s, The House of Blue Leaves. Originally
produced in 1970, the play has been revived at the Vivian Beaumont Theatre by Gregory Mosher, formerly
artistic director at the Goodman Theatre in Chicago.
(As I write this the play is still running.) At that time,
the splendid cast included Swoozie Kurz, Stockard
Channing, and Danny Aiello. John Mahoney, yet
another member of the Steppenwolf Company who
has made a success outside Chicago, played the featured role of Artie Shaughnessy. At the Tony awards,
Kurz, Mahoney, and the director Jerry Zaks would all
win awards.
So on that particular Saturday afternoon at O'Neal's
we basked in the good feelings that warm the moments after a good show. We watched groups depart
the theatres, disintegrate into individuals, and disperse
into the city. We were waiting for John Mahoney,
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whom we had invited to JOin us after the show, and
thrilled to see him making his way toward our table.
Now I must confess that my wife and I are fascinated by the presence of professional performers. We
often stall for a bit around theatres after the show to
get a glimpse of one of the actors on his way home.
We don't line up at stage doors for autographs, but we
often take a stroll around the theatre, have a cup of
coffee across the street, or sit in the lobby of the
neighborhood hotel most likely to be accommodating
visiting actors. If we happen to bump into somebody,
and we happen to have a pen poised and a pad of
paper ready, well ...
We've had a couple of triumphs. There was the
time, for instance, when we were able to talk a bit with
Leonard Bernstein after a performance of his opera A
Quiet Place at the Kennedy Center; and once we nearly
crashed into Mike Nichols as he dashed from the Edison Hotel to the Barrymore Theatre to view a performance of a play he had directed. Later at that same
performance, we brushed elbows with John Houseman
and Robin Williams.
Why is it that coming into contact with performers
off stage is so exhilarating? Perhaps its because when
you're that close to the stars you think they can't help
but take notice of you. For a few minutes on that day
at O'Neal's we had the undivided attention of John
Mahoney, a man to whom we had paid attention for
years. He repaid us for our patronage by feeding us
bits of inside (if inconsequential) information about
himself and the company, his own candid opinions of
the quality of recent productions and performers, and
a bit of a preview of the Steppenwolf future. Just as
important, he listened to our opinions. For once, he
was a member of our audience.
The House of Blue Leaves has much to do with and
much to say about audiences. At the center of the play
is Artie Shaughnessy, a man who wants desperately to
be something more than the ordinary man in the
movie audience. On amateur night at the El Dorado,
a dumpy little club, we find him accompanying himself
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as he croons songs he wrote himself (obviously and
comically echoing an entire epoch of second rate Tin
Pan Alley tunes), e.g., "Back Together Again," "Where
is the Devil in Evelyn." He forces a bit of lounge-lizard
chat with the audience. He is irked that the management hasn't arranged for a spotlight, as they promised.

In light of the Billy Einhorn
imperative, let us consider the
audience, whether we want to or not.
When it comes to audiences, actors
are fearful , directors misanthropic,
critics contemptuous, and only
marketing specialists solicitous.
Back home at his apartment in Sunnyside, Queens,
Artie suffers through his ordinary life: he's a
zookeeper, father of a deranged son, married to a
mad wife named Bananas, and mad about his mistress,
Bunny Flingus. But Artie is a dreamer. He dreams of
his name up in lights, put there by Billy Einhorn, his
oldest friend who moved to Hollywood and became a
movie mogul.
The fantastically romantic Bunny-a vision of pink
angora and plastic rain booties-refuses to cook for
Artie until they're married but she feeds his dream extravagantly. She is prepared to fly away to stardom
with Artie, as soon as he can arrange to have his wife
committed to a sanitarium on Long Island. Artie loves
the poor demented Bananas as the vessel of his
memories and hates her as the anchor of his ordinariness. He is determined to cut himself loose from her.
He has the institution picked out: he visited one day
and saw a tree on the property with bright blue leaves;
then what were really blue birds flew away and turned
some other tree blue.
After a marvelously twisted series of events-which
includes the accidental death of Billy Einhorn's starlet
girlfriend in an explosion outside Artie's apartmentthe famous Billy arrives in Queens. He blesses Artie
and Bananas, but falls in love with Bunny and her
cooking. Finally, Billy whisks Bunny away with him.
After watching his chance for fame and fortune float
away as if on a magic carpet, the gentle, musical Artie
falls into a fit of rage and despair and strangles
Bananas with his bare hands.
Guare uses elements of form and content to keep
the idea of audience prominently before us. His characters make contact with the audience in various direct
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ways: asides, soliloquies, and simple direct address.
The action takes place on October 4, 1965, in the
foreground of one of the great spectacles of the decade: Pope Paul VI's visit to the United Nations and his
celebration of mass at Yankee Stadium. The entire city
is Paul's audience, monitoring every inch of his progress on their TV sets.
But the members of Artie's circle are not satisfied to
watch from the curbs or on television; they want to be
in the picture. Each of them wants the Pope to yield
to his or her need for attention. Bunny wants the pontiff to bless Artie's sheet music; Artie wants the Pope's
holy presence to work a miracle cure on Bananas;
Artie's son Ron intends to assassinate the Pope and
then to ascend the throne of Peter as Pope Ronald I.
The House of Blue Leaves reminds us of the popular
philosophical tenet of the Sixties' culture that everybody would be a star, if only for fifteen minutes. It
seemed that nearly everyone expected his opportunity
to be on television when the cameras pulled back to
bring the masses of demonstrators, strikers, soldiers,
music lovers, and others into the shot.
As demanding as the would-be stars are, the final
claim of the play is not for stardom but for spectatorship. Earlier, as everyone waits for the Pope's arrival,
Bunny has introduced the idea. Her intuition tells her
that
. .. right now, the Pope is flying through that star-filled
sky, bumping planets out of the way, and he's asleep
dreaming of the mobs waiting for him. When famous
people go to sleep at night, it's us they dream of, Artie.
The famous ones-they're the real people. We're the
creatures of their dreams.

Without an audience to celebrate him, the celebrity
would not exist. And as Billy Einhorn, the very incarnation of stardom, is about to return to Hollywood, he
solemnly assures Artie and Bananas that if they
weren't
here in Sunnyside, seeing my work, loving my work, I
could never work again. You're my touch with reality .. . .
Do you know what the greatest talent in the world is? To
be an audience. Anybody can create. But to be an audience . . . be an audience . . .

II

In light of the Billy Einhorn imperative let us consider the audience, whether we want to or not. When
it comes to audiences, actors are fearful, directors misanthropic, critics contemptuous, and only marketing
specialists solicitous. As Aristotle tells us in the Poetics,
acting out plays is a kind of natural thing for people
to do. But going out to watch people acting out plays
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is, if not unnatural, certainly more unusual--especially
in the age of the electronic home entertainment
center. Who are these people? What makes them tick
or, at least, buy tickets?
One Sunday last season, as I settled into my seat for
the Steppenwolf Theatre's production of The Caretaker,
I barely looked up as the house manager bounded
onto the stage to address the audience. He told us
about the delights of the upcoming season, reminded
us that we'd be wiser to subscribe than to purchase
single tickets, and extended the usual various and sundry pleasantries. These pre-show exercises are not uncommon in Chicago theatres and, generally, I find
them to be almost as unbearable as when a waitress or
a bank teller tries to establish a life-long friendship before finally tending to the business that brought us
into one another's company.
But on this particular occasion, the house manager
had brought with him a very special icon. At the end
of his speech, he held up an Antoinette Perry award
statue that had been presented to the Steppenwolf
Theatre as the outstanding regional theatre company
in the nation. "This," he said, "is yours."
On April 4, 1986, the Steppenwolf Theatre celebrated its tenth anniversary; last season, the Goodman
celebrated its sixtieth season. And the season before
was the Wisdom Bridge Theatre's tenth. And though
these anniversary celebrations do commemorate the
fact that plays have been performed under the auspices of certain theatres for a remarkable number of
years, they ought also to be times when we remember
that audiences have been coming to see those plays for
an equal number of years. And which, finally, is the
more remarkable fact? In the last fifteen years, Chicago has truly become the nation's second city in the
live theatre industry. I would venture to say that in
terms of their support of professional theatres located
in their communities, Chicago audiences are unrivaled.
The presentation of the Tony to the Steppenwolf audience that day was a token of appreciation for that
support. Further, that gilded figure signified the importance of the audience to the theatre event itself.
The audience is of the essence of the theatre event.
You can have poetry without a reader, but you can't
have theatre without an audience. One deceptively
simple definition of theatre has it that theatre is, fundamentally, "A" performing "B" while "C" looks on.
There's always lots of talk about A and B, but just who
is C? What moves her and Mr. C out from in front of
the television and into the Theatre Building, the Shubert, the Goodman, or (God forbid!) the Arie Crown?
We know enough about the Cs to know that over
the cycle of a theatre's growth and decline they are
different people, or at least their reasons for attending
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the theatre and the quality of their participation in the
theatrical event vary. Mr. and Mrs. C, for example,
may be elitists, patrons, or faddists. Ultimately, the Cs
may be devotees.
The first audience to discover and attend a new
theatre is an elite. They are usually ed ucated to the
appreciation of drama and theatre art. They may be
friends or acquaintances of the company or patrons of
other, similar theatres. These are the people who seek
out the theatre wherever they are and will travel many
miles from their places of residence to see it.
There is a phase in the building of a theatre establishment when audiences function as patrons. Like Renaissance nobles, these are people who are well-educated and more or less monied. They appreciate
theatre, but their motivations are primarily civic. They
believe that theatre art is good for their commu nity.
They buy season tickets in order to make sure that

When It Wants Me to Think about It
When it wants me to think about it
it lets me be filled with it, grows
like a small cosmos, has a solar system,
atmosphere, rings.
Right now it writes its own bible,
thinks of a constitution, selects a form
of government; and it is maturing,
is trying to show me it is growing wise.
It wants to annex the next town,
then a part of the neighboring state.
It thinks about sovereignty over a country
rich in gold, oil-it wants
frankincense, myrrh.
Everyone should be filled with it
the way I am, it whispers
and gives me a string of ideas to fly,
a chain letter, and a can of mace.
It gives me a diagram for a bomb
and I am to go out in the world for it,
to say to mothers and fathers
that it is dearer than their children.
I am to say to the sons and daughters
that it is glorious. All the time
I am saying to myself it is nothing nothing nothing.

Pat James
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companies of actors will continue to be available for
their amusement and edification. Often, their names
are to be found in the various donor categories and on
advisory board lists.
After the elitists and the patrons have gotten a new
theatre off the ground, they may look across the aisle
and see a new kind of audience member. We could
call them "yuppies," but let's call them "faddists" :
those with the highly disposable incomes ever in
search of the thing to do. At present theatre, and especially Chicago theatre, is chic. Theatre programs are
proper status symbols for the in-crowd to leave on
their coffee tables .
Free tickets from the boss, tantalizing publicity, a
visiting TV star in the cast, a guarantee of entertainment, must-see reviews from colleagues at the office,
a long-resisted capitulation to an insistent spouse: who
knows what brings people to the theatre? Whatever
may be the reason they attend, this new theatre audience is of particular interest, not only to the theatre
marketing specialist, but also to anyone committed to
opening the multi-beneficent experience of live
dramatic performance to more people. Moreover, in
reflecting upon an audience in its initial confrontation
with live dramatic performance, we are led to focus on
issues basic to the theatre event itself.
The programs given to the audience at the trendy
Ivanhoe Theatre are telling. The program contains a
capsule primer for "the television viewers" in its audience: "Each live performance is special and unique
and is distinguished by the fact that the actors can
hear the audience and be heartened by your laughter,
tears, or applause, and completely distracted by unnecessary conversations. Your silence during performances is an important part of the performance."
In other words, "please don't talk during the show."
But there is more in the I van hoe management's caveat
to its customers than just this simple directive. It tells
us much about audiences and the importance of Audience. First, though the audience member whose attention is being requested may be in the theatre for the
first time, he is quite used to viewing dramatic entertainments. Everyone watches television; many people
still go to movie houses.
Nor are new theatre audiences new to spectating in
general. While experts tell us that we are becoming
more active (or are those the physical fitness equipment promoters?), Americans still spend a great deal
of time spectating. Being there and watching makes
up a significant portion of life: in TV rooms and
movie theatres, but also in lecture rooms, meeting
halls, sports stadiums, and church naves. There are
unspoken
agreements--conventions--of
spectating
peculiar to each of these spaces. The audience in a
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particular space spectates in a particular way. And, as
the reminder "to the television viewers" suggests, spectating conventions are not altogether transferable.
The conventions of the TV room are not the conventions of the theatre, just as the conventions of the
stadium are not the conventions of the sanctuary. Conventional behavior of any kind is the result of a complex development and manifests the interaction of motives too numerous to list. However, one important
shaper of conventional spectating behavior is purpose.
Why have the spectators come to watch? Keeping in
mind that specific purpose relates to myriad individual
factors, we might sample a few very general purposes:
one goes to church to pray, praise, and give thanks;
to the stadium to thrill at vicarious competition; to the
lecture room to feed the mind; to the TV room to disengage the mind.

Free tickets from the boss,
tantalizing publicity, a visiting 1V
star in the cast, a guarantee of
entertainment, must-see reviews from
colleagues at the office, a longresisted capitulation to a spouse:
who knows what brings an audience?

A discussion of purposes for going to the theatre
brings us back to the elitists, the patrons, and the faddists. But there is a fourth type of theatre spectator,
the devotee. The devotee attends the theatre because it
is, for him, a source of meaning. He has chosen to devote himself to a theatre because its productions have
been meaningful experiences. The devotee does not so
much expect or demand that his theatre experience be
meaningful as he trusts that it will. In his trust, he
comes to the theatre with an open mind.
The devotee understands the special conventionsthe ritual--of theatre attendance. He is familiar with
the process of buying tickets and he realizes the importance of seat locations. The devotee knows when to
arrive at the theatre, how to get useful information
from the program, and the functions of the theatre's
employees. The ritual signal for the play to begin is
the lowering of the house lights, often accompanied by
the raising of some recorded music. (The conventional
raising of the curtain has, for the most part, been cancelled.) Now comes a very important part of the ritual:
a period during which the audience member must
come to the play; that is, he must actively inquire into
the plot, characters, and setting.
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This last is the major difference between television
and theatre viewing. Perhaps the Ivanhoe program
should contain another warning to the television viewers : "You may not understand absolutely everything
about this play in the first two minutes. Please don't
give up. We need you to be an audience." .
.
Theatre is a poetic enterprise, an art-makmg activity. The thing made is certainly more than a script and
even more than a performance. The thing made is an
event in space and time contained by a beginning and
an end. Within this box of time there takes place a
dynamic interaction of poetic forces. The most pr~m
inent interaction is the one between actor and scnpt.
Undoubtedly, script shapes actor and actor shapes
script until something new has been made: a "performance ." But many in the audience understand the
nature of their participation only in this limited way:
they have come to observe the performance, the product of actors working from a script. This is what they
paid for; this is what they will judge to be good or
bad.
The script-actor nexus is only a part of the event.
Just as crucial to the making of the event are th_e
dynamic connections between the actor and the audience and the script and the audience. Of course, "the
actors can hear the audience and be heartened by
their laughter, tears, and appla,use, and completely distracted by their unnecessary conversations," but the
audience has much more to contribute to the making
of the event than simple emotional response. Such response is only the noise made by the collision of the
audience's beliefs, attitudes, and values with those
being projected from the stage. In the theatre, t_h e
spectator comes into immediate and direct contact With
the other: persons, ideas, actions that are alien to himself. It is the rare spectator who is not moved in some
direction by such contact.
To be a "devotee" means to offer up one's self in return for meaning. In the ideal theatre, script, actors,
and audience are offered up in hope that a new and
meaningful thing will be created, even though not
every event will be meaningful.
The devotee knows what it means to be an audience.
That the form of a play or production may be unfamiliar is not discouraging but stimulating. The devotee's ritual sophistication, born of practice, puts him
in a position to receive meaning from the performance. What the devotee does not do is insist that the
theatre experience fit itself into his framework of expectations. Happy is the theatre audience that comes
to the play prepared, not only to willingly suspend its
disbelief, but to extend to the performance its trust,
patience, and goodwill. This is the audience that
merits the Tony award.
••

The Pines Revisited
A moon such as this,
dropped low to a crouch on the
crest of the pines, was here before.
her sentinel eye always
off-center between us, watching your
orange kitchen window to signal,
then flinching at screams.
But nothing tonight.
New neighbors, young as these
wands tattering green of the future,
know nothing of moon as reminder
or pines as diving retainer
of echoes, except those of
laughter. They sleep now
behind wide-open windows. Their
children can burrow all day
where yours ran from to hide.
From The Man who might dart
any minute from denseness
even this moon can't dilute.
Or sun that will come up tomorrow
as no great surprise to those
easily breathing where
you waited sleepless, so long.
Eyes sealed agaim. moon
washing blue from the red, the
courageous, once flaming
blood red of your house, they
fear no invasions, can come
to the historical fringe in the
morning, not knowing. But I
and this moon cannot sleep. We
listen for curses, for footsteps
raking a trail through its
needled expanse, for forms dashed
against moonscreen, for
glass smashing in, for screams
from your orange kitchen window.
But nothing tonight.
Nothing but silvered green silence.
And echoes, well memorized.

Lois Reiner

••
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A. G. Roeber

THE PERILS OF PRIVATE RELIGION
Reflections on Religion, Morality, and Public Discourse

The recent Supreme Court decision which appears to render unacceptable moments of silence at the beginning of
public school classes might be taken as a perfect baccalaureate topic provoking comment on issues upon which
we feel compelled to speak. In fact, before this decision was
rendered I had already constructed most of what I have to
say to you this morning, and I feel I need alter almost nothing as a result of that decision. It merely reenforces the argument which I wish to advance, namely, that the notion
that religion is a private matter is an unacceptable position,
both politically and intellectually. When Senator Lowell
Weicker of Connecticut can hail the court's decision precisely
on these grounds, I can only wonder at the quality of senatorial perception with which we are graced in these times.
Let me make it clear from the outset that I agree with the
view of English historian E. H. Carr that to know what history you read you ought to know what historian did the
writing. You should know at the outset that this particular
historian of America comes from a Lutheran Christian tradition and that he does not regard prayer in the schools to be
a very interesting or compelling issue, that he wishes devoudy that our time could be spent on far more substantive
issues, that in any event, as a trinitarian Christian he would
not himself participate in some vague prayer concocted by
committee, nor would he permit his children to do so.
Having said that much let me reiterate that I still find the
rhetoric of Mr. Weicker and the ACLU lawyers alarming
and annoying in the extreme. For to say that religion is solely a private matter will, I am certain, not be understood in
the manner in which I can only hope the Senator meant
those words, namely, that the government cannot prescribe
a certain form of religion or make a very meaningful deci-

A. G. Roeber has recently accepted an appointment as Associate Professor of History at the University of Illinois at
Chicago. Prior to that he taught at Denver, Brown, Princeton, and, from 1979 to 1986, at Lawrence. This essay originated as a Baccalaureate Address at Lawrence in june,
1985.
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sion about what shall constitute religious expression in public
forums such as our schools. Instead, I am very nearly certain
that the expression, "religion is a private matter," will be
taken by the unthinking as well as by the ideologically convicted to mean that religion is irrelevant to public life and
hence has no meaning other than the subjective, or at most,
the tribal. In other words, religion is significant only to me,
or to the people who agree with me in every detail about
what I determine to be "religious."
I suggest that you, as graduates of this institution,
know better. The word religion derives from the latin
word religare, which means to bind together. It is a quintessentially public, not a private, phenomenon. Religion
cannot by its very nature be anything but public. Now
by contrast, articles of belief, what one might call faith,
are of course intensely private. If I might borrow some
terminology from legal scholarship, we might say that
faith exists under a "penumbra" which is both intensely
private, and shared to a limited degree with those who
are "of the faith," "in the tent," with those who are fellow believers. The expression of faith, however, in a religion-that expression of worship, of the very articles of
belief, the working out of emotive traditions and associations publicly expressed-these always exist under a
penumbra which extends far beyond the individual
member and indeed beyond the boundaries of the tribe
alone.
And for this reason , religion is necessarily a public
matter whose expression will always impinge heavily
upon the public life of the entire body politic unless
that political nation decides to exclude the religious altogether from the public domain. It is, of course, that
issue which has divided opinion considerably in our
day. Exclusion, total exclusion, in fact is not tolerable
under a constitution of a democratic republic that not
only provides for separation of church and state
(which it does), but which also provides explicit protection for the expression of religious belief, including, I
think, debates in the public forum over competing and
conflicting moral and ethical visions of what we are
about as a people.
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Let me suggest further to you that only those people
who are deeply grounded in the specific tradition of
their tribal beliefs are truly capable of bringing to public discourse a valuable perspective on ethics, morals,
and norms of behavior, a perspective that has been developed from a specific context. I hope you are all
now aware as graduating seniors that all knowledge is
contextual-not excluding that knowledge which has
to do with religious belief. And for that reason, it is
imperative for all members of a peculiar religious tradition to bear in mind the contextuality, not merely of
faith, nor merely of the convictions which have been
developed under the penumbra of tribal association,
doctrine, and practice-but the contextuality of religion as well.

Pelikan is pointing to the paradox
that Berger noted: it is really
through the particularity of a
specific tradition that we are able
to make those connections to the
broader world that lie beyond our
most immediate values and beliefs.
In the American setting this means that one recognizes the historical reality that we are a democratic republic whose public forum has been characterized by
debates over conflicting moral visions. Far from being
a liability, this tradition has in fact been the very
source of strength for America's religious and political
life, a fact that Alexis de Tocqueville noted 150 years
ago when he tried to explain to his European audience
the paradox that, as he said, "religion is the first of
[the Americans'] political institutions" and was in fact
all the more vital because it was not formally connected to the operations of government.
Yet de Tocqueville also insisted that the commitment Americans expressed not only toward various
creeds but also toward other small institutions such as
the family stood at the very heart of the democracy's
vitality. What Edmund Burke referred to as the "small
platoons" of voluntary associations were, in both his
mind and de Tocqueville's, essential for all broader
and more expansive expressions of loyalty, especially
loyalty to the republic.
The modern sociologist Peter Berger has echoed
exactly these themes in arguing that political expressions that mirror individualism, expressions of the autonomous self over against the mass of modern society, are not only not compelling but are in fact invidious and destructive. Berger argues the urgent political
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need for what he calls "mediating structures"-those
very associations such as family, church, and
synagogue-the very particularities by which all of us
come to know ourselves and our world and through
which we express not merely loyalty to self and tribe
but where we develop those mores which have broader
implication for our collective lives in a pluralistic society.
The problem of course is that abstract concepts, denatured and vague expressions of norms and values
like "democracy," "equality," "freedom," and "individualism," only become compelling when one begins
to see them worked out in concrete, contextual ways.
Jaroslav Pelikan has written in his essay The Vindication
of Tradition that "an abstract concept of parenthood is
no substitute for real parents. An abstract cosmopolitanism is no substitute for a real tradition." Pelikan, too, is pointing to the paradox that Berger noted:
it is really through the particularity of a specific tradition that we are able to make those connections to the
broader world which lie beyond our closest penumbra
of shared values, beliefs, and assumptions.
Pelikan continues, "it is from tradition that one
learns to know the liberation that can come only
through discipline and a recognition of boundaries.
. .. the growth of insight-in science, in the arts, in
philosophy and theology-has not come through progressively sloughing off more and more of tradition,
as though insight would be purest and deepest when
it has finally freed itself of the dead past. It simply has
not worked that way."
Now let me make the present context and the present tradition of today's ceremony a bit more specific.
Sixty years ago Henry Merritt Wriston became president of Lawrence College and initiated a sweeping
series of reforms that have marked the institution to
this very day. In 1925, as Wriston took over as president, the nation was riveted to a dream unfolding in
Dayton, Tennessee, where a young biology teacher
named John Scopes decided to test the state statute
which prohibited the teaching of Darwin's theory of
evolution in the classroom. This famous trial, the
Scopes or the Monkey Trial as it was sometimes referred to, is often regarded as the opening battle in a war
between
science
and
religion,
between
cosmopolitanism and provincialism, between liberated
thinking and superstition in American life. Of course,
it stands historically as part of a much older debate,
but to a degree one can say that before 1925 these issues which seemed to pit reason against revelation, the
heart against the head of America, had never seemed
so starkly defined as they were in that trial. The war
of which the Scopes trial was a part rages yet today.
Wriston followed the events of the conflict in his
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time carefully, and at the spring commencement at
Lawrence in 1926 addressed the senior class in these
words: "You are going out into a religious world
where civil war has broken out afresh. A conflict,
thought to have been settled a generation ago, has
burst into new and more violent activity. The impact
of a world changing in every other important phase of
human thought and activity has been too much , and
the church is being jostled in the tumult. Doubts and
questionings and problems assail accepted dogmas in
much the same way that fresh scientific hypotheses
upset the older assumptions
a satisfying
philosophy of life can no longer be inherited from our
fathers, when the demand is for people who can think
for themselves . . . . "
Now Wriston did not mean in saying this that his
seniors should foreswear the traditions of their fathers
and mothers-Lawrence was a Methodist college and
Wriston himself a devout and committed Methodist
layman. He did mean, of course, to demand of Lawrentians then, as we continue to do now, that they take
seriously the debates then raging and that they have
considered grounds upon which to reaffirm a tradition
which could no longer simply be inherited, that is,
taken for granted. Moreover, Wriston went on to urge
that the studied, deliberate commitment to a particular
religious tradition was essentially not a purely individual act--or at least it could never stop, if I could
borrow my own phrase, under the penumbra of
shared faith. Religious commitment always develops
under the penumbra of broader, public implications.
I would suggest to you that in a certain way both
sides in the debate that opened up at that time over
religion and science or reason and revelation, the debate over religion and its expression in the public
arena, have misapprehended the true nature of our
peril. First of all, I find it hard to disagree with Robert
Bellah, who has recently written in his collection of essays entitled Habits of the Heart that "much of the
thinking about the self of educated Americans, thinking that has become almost hegemonic in our universities and much of the middle class, is based on inadequate social science, impoverished philosophy, and
vacuous theology." Above all else, Bellah believes,
Americans today know nothing either about the traditions of belief-the biblical traditions which helped to
create modern Western society--or about the broader
public traditions of civic republicanism that lie behind
American institutions and political life and that undergird our political, literary, and aesthetic accomplishments.
In addition, the failure of specific religious traditions to know themselves and to be confident about
themselves, to speak clearly of what their traditions
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have to say about public social issues, means that public discourse in this country increasingly lapses into a
kind of nervous, meaningless series of generalizations
about abstract rights and values. Such abstractions, I
think, have the effect of divorcing issues from values
in public life.
The phrase "religion is a private matter" is itself a
manifestation of this failure , and taken at its face value
the phrase is calculated to make impossible true discourse on political and social issues that by their very
nature can only be debated in the light of various
competing normative religious and ethical traditions.
Such a divorce is in fact perilous to the very survival
of the republic itself, not least because historically, our
tradition as a democratic republic, as de Tocqueville
said, was never better served and the health of its politics never better safeguarded than when there was, in
fact, intense debate stemming from tradition and
emerging from principle, not merely convenience.

Any student of logic can tell you
that if the moral sentiments that we
regularly express in common-sense
language have any value at all, they
must point to a "prevenient reality";
we assume that some sort of reality
stands behind those sentiments.
Any student of logic can tell you that if moral sentiments which we express all the time in common
sense language have any value at all, they must point
to a "prevenient reality"-we assume that some sort of
reality stands behind those sentiments which are a part
of our universal human experience. If these moral
sentiments of guilt and shame, joy and resentment, or
gratitude and praise are in fact a part of the network
of human relationships, then we rightly must debate
by what authority, upon what moral foundation, do
such moral sentiments assume politically normative
status, that is, upon what authority and moral foundation do they become law? To be compelling, law itself must be linked to moral sentiment, rooted in traditions of belief.
Here, of course, is where the issues of religion and
the "public square," if I may borrow Richard John
Neuhaus' term for the political and social arena, become most controversial. To those on the one hand
who seek to impose some sort of orthodoxy upon the
nation, whether that be in the form of Christian
prayers in the schools or declarations that the U.S. is
a "Christian nation," one might find it useful to quote
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Oliver Cromwell, no mean moral crusader himself,
who in his letter to the Scottish Church in 1650
pleaded, "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think
it possible you may be mistaken."
Now no one would conclude on the basis of reading
that letter that Cromwell, in so saying, was urging his
coreligionists of the Presbyterian tradition to become
indifferent to matters of faith, or to public, political,
and social issues. In fact, in this context I do not myself see any real possibility that a particular form of
evangelical protestantism is going to become the established or publicly dominant tradition of American
political life. The reason why this particular tradition,
and it is that, has felt moved to join battle in a way
not expressed so articulately since 1925 has to do, I
think, with assumptions made on the other side, by
another tradition which the evangelicals themselves
usually label secular humanism.
The problem with this particular tradition (and it is
that: it has a long pedigree that can be traced back
well into the eighteenth century of American life) is
that since the 1920s it has sought to define itself as the
near sole inheritor of what one might call the rational,
progressive, liberating, democratic representation of
"modern" life. Interestingly enough, John Dewey, who
was not exactly a defender of religious tradition,
warned against this attitude to his fellow philosophers
in 1922 in an article in the New Republic, where he
commented that "the church-going classes and those
who come from the influence of evangelical Christianity-it is these people who form the backbone of
philanthropic and social reform to political action,
pacifism, popular education. They embody and express the spirit of friendly good will toward classes
which are at an economic disadvantage and toward
other nations, especially when the latter show any disposition toward a republican form of government.
The middle west, the prairie country has been the
center of active social philanthropy and political progressivism because it is the chief home of this folk."
Again, if one returns to a specific context and to a
concrete set of examples, I think you would find that
the leaders of this particular secular tradition, at least
in the present generation, are in many cases people
who have just escaped from a religious tradition which
they found oppressive, irrational, or somehow damaging. Now that, too, is a pattern or phenomenon which
boasts a long and hoary tradition. One need only think
of Voltaire's execrations upon the Catholic religion of
which he had been a member.
In point of fact, the public square of America is
perhaps slightly in danger of being dominated or
ruled by this new estate of secularized intellectuals.
What has happened, I think, is that the new class of
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sophisticated people who speak for a secular viewpoint
have been better educated and therefore more successful in pressing their particular point of view about
norms and values in public life than the evangelicals.
The true danger, however, and the real peril of private religion lies in the response of the vast majority
of Americans who belong to neither camp. Examine
your own reaction to matters such as prayer in the
schools, abortion, tax credit for parochial schools,
genetic engineering, and other volatile issues. Do you
not find yourself reacting as I did when I said at the
beginning of this address that I devoutly wish that
such issues would go away? Who among us would not
rather that we did not have to face up to the unpleasantness, the rancor, the raucous debates, and the uncivil behavior thrown up by partisans on both sides of
these issues? And how many of us have succumbed to
the convenient escape contained in the phrase: well,
religion is a private matter.
Stanley Hauerwas has pointedly remarked of this
trend: "Private morality has increasingly followed the
form of our public life. People feel their only public
duty is to follow their own interests as far as possible
limited only by the rule that we must not unfairly limit
others' freedom." The position Hauerwas describes
constitutes only an abstraction which gives us no particular help when it comes down to coupling policy issues to matters of norms and values. Upon examination we know that this cannot suffice. Faith may be a
private matter but religion never is.
Our danger, I think, lies precisely in this exhaustion,
in our willful! or careless ignorance of what specific
traditions have to say or fail to say about issues that,
whether we admit it consciously or not, matter deeply
to us not only individually but collectively as a nation.
Power, even more than nature, abhors a vacuum.
Nothing is more dangerous to the survival of an
American experiment in democratic republicanism
than the abandonment of the public square, the creation of Neuhaus' Naked Public Square where discourse
emanating from principle about competing and conflicting moral visions will no longer be permitted to
take place.
It is precisely the danger that this naked public
square may be evolving that has moved Neuhaus and
Pelikan and Berger, all members of my own particular
tradition, to write impassioned pleas for the defense of
and the knowledgeable commitment to a particular
tradition and to mediating structures. They have done
so not, I emphasize, in a call to provincial tribalism,
but from a demand for a clear vision of the public responsibility which all traditions have to defend-not
out of convenience but from principle-the arena of
democracy which allows them to compete for a hear23

mg.
Our danger lies not so much in the possibility of the
new religious right imposing a sectarian morality upon
the whole (though if that were to happen, one could
only say that indifferent and ignorant people both
pseudo-religious and secular alike let it happen). Far
more serious, I think, is the possibility that those
among us who mouth the secular piety that religion is
only a private matter will thereby succeed in stripping
the public square of moral debate. The vacuum
created by such an awful silence will be filled by the
most ominous creation of the twentieth century, the
totalitarian state, which acknowledges no moral standard except its own measure of self-interest, expressed
in the exercise of naked power.
Let me therefore end with a story, a kind of parable, from my own context, my own tradition. The
story in its large historical outline is well known to all
of you, but it holds deep personal meaning for me.
The last of my father's family to live in the village
in Saxony-now a part of the German Democratic Republic-where they had lived for 400 years perished in
the Nazi concentration camps during the 1930s and
1940s. Early members of the Communist party in
Saxony in the 1920s, they had long since abandoned
the Lutheran Church in which the family had lived
and worshipped in both Germany and America since
1534. They abandoned it, I think, because this tradition no longer spoke to the social and political issues
of the real, lived context of their lives.
The perversion of Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms, that of the state caring for God's law in the
world and the church addressing God's promises for
a life continuing beyond this world, had by 1883 advanced so far that during the 400th anniversary celebrations of Luther's birth, the Reformer had been expropriated by Bismarck and transformed into a prop
for a political empire in which the church was already
moribund. By the 1880s the churches in Germany already stood empty in the midst of a society that had
become indifferent to a tradition which had failed conspicuously to be a religion, to be a force binding
people together and addressing the contextual issues
of their public, their social, their political lives. The
long-term implications of that failure and the resulting
indifference were so horrific that the tradition in
which I stand has not recovered from those events
even today.
Pastor Martin Niemoeller, himself a strong opponent of the Nazi state, penned these now familiar lines
about this peril: "In Germany they came first for the
Jews and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew.
Then they came for the trade unionists and I didn't
speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. And then
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they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me and
by that time no one was left to speak up. " The public
square of Germany, of course, had been naked for
quite some time.
And you? Do you remain indifferent, do you remain
ignorant of your own traditions, both religious and
civic? President Wriston and we here today would not
have it so. Wriston's words might well serve you today
as they did 60 years ago: "Grow with your age ... do
your part in widening the horizon of mankind, and in
seeking adequate solutions to the problems of church
and state, of business and of learning." To that I
would add, do it not for yourselves alone, but for the
sake of us all, for all children, for your children, for
the world in which we live. I urge you to flee the false
security and the comfortable illusion of private religion. You owe the best which the traditions of Lawrence have to offer you , nothing less. God speed. Cl

Changes
Her apron lifted, hesitant, then spilled
down creases in her skirt whose hem furled
when she tiptoed over sidewalk cracks.
Tweed suits and silk dresses gathered
for the show at Wrigley Plaza, lured
by burnished wrinkles in her wooden face
painted sea-green. The puppeteer
whose trousered legs blocked Lake Shore wind
as her hands-veins in bas-relief, floated
on waves on an accordioned dirge-recalled
the strings whose black knots spoke
the final word.
You spoke of other cords
when a campanile we could not find
tolled with the accordion. First
the bell at rest, her crown by canons held
fast to her stock. The ringer feels the stay
as she glides past the balance, rests against
the slide, then pulls him to his toes. He'll
not let go, though deaf from her thick tongue
which peals random numbers in wayward reverie,
he, a prisoner; she, in bondage kept.
The puppeteer heard, too; the crone, knowing,
stared at us through black pools for eyes.

Martha M. Vertreace
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The Sales Lady
Richard Lee
Last summer on my TV a
spaceship of tourists, including a
grandfather and his grandson, hovered lovingly over the Statue of
Liberty. Then, back on earth and
under the benediction of the
Statue, the old man handed something sacred to the boy. A close-up
of his palm revealed a Statue of
Liberty medallion given to the
grandfather by his father long ago,
in 1986, during the centennial
celebration of the Statue. The commercial then cut to a shining pair
of the medallions in gold and
silver, and a voice-over from the
United States Treasury hustled us
to buy them now "singly or in sets"
at our nearest K-Mart.
Well, "gold and silver have I
none," and while I prefer fewer
Treasury dollars spent to propagandize me, this TV commercial
stands out as one of the more
warming in a long, hot summer of
commercials during the most commercialized celebration of liberty
ever imagined by a free people.
This commercial also stands out as
a nearly perfect parable of the conceptual difficulty Americans suffer
in celebrating liberty.
This is not the place to do a
frame-by-frame semiological analysis of the parable, but it may be the
place for commonsensically noting
that this commercial urges us to buy
something to celebrate liberty and
melds indistinguishably into the
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commercials of the usual movers
and sellers of capitalist America.
The line is fine between a deodorant commercial showing you the pit
of the upraised arm of the Statue
of Liberty while urging you also to
"Raise Your Hand If You're
SURE!" and the United States
Treasury nudging you to buy a
medallion or two to "Keep Liberty
in Mint Condition!" The same
propagandizing of liberty as consumer freedom occurs in either
case.
To be sure, there is nothing
wrong and everything right with
consumer freedom, and the ready
availability of affordable goods, including gold and silver medallions,
is properly considered a freedom.
Americans are justly famous for
getting consumer freedom down
right-and for expanding it at
home and exporting it abroadeven when they are wrong on other
freedoms both here and there. In
commercialized celebrations of liberty, however, the propagandizing
of liberty as consumer freedom
drives out all other considerations
of liberty and becomes vicious. In
the last stages of this conceptual
muddle consumer freedom defines
liberty rather than liberty defining
consumer freedom.
Part of this muddling lies in the
nature of American propaganda
(principally but not exclusively
capitalist advertising) itself. It is impossible to propagandize a person
or a people into being free or acting freely, but it is relatively easy
(glitches duly noted) to propagandize consumers into the consumption of goods-and into the belief
that their consumption proves their
liberty. This part of the muddle I
think is now past solution in our
society, and capitalist advertising
will in large part determine our
concept of liberty until the last sale
is made. That part of liberty which
depends upon freedom from propagandized consumption will always

have difficult days.
Another part of the muddle lies
in the nature of American patriotic
celebrations like the lollapalooza
last summer with Our Lady of Perpetual Immigration. The quarter of
a billion of us now settled in this
country really have little in common with each other except our
being Americans, and our celebrations of liberty must necessarily be
broad, loud, and nearly empty so
everybody can pour his or her own
meaning into them. Consumer
freedom is probably the most universal and most innocuous meaning
to pour into liberty, and those appalled by consumer freedom
dominating our celebrations of liberty should consider the worse alternatives. Would anyone prefer
the propagandized meaning of liberty be Manifest Destiny? Christian
America? Star Wars to End All
Wars? Liberty propagandized as
consumer freedom is false, but it
may be a safer falsehood than liberty celebrated as unrestrained
nationalism, militarism, and religious fanaticism.
My own view upon my TV viewing of America's rollicking commercialized celebration of liberty
last summer is that we lose clarity
about liberty when it is celebrated
alone. The sustaining myth of the
Enlightenment remains liberty and
equality and fraternity . Unless we
find fresh parables to re-enact that
myth fully, we may wallow in a
muddle about liberty so insidious
that we know not the muddle we
are in. It has become unfashionable
to connect liberty, equality, and
fraternity as the instruments they
are for each other, but we need to
start fashioning those very parables
now for the sake of the grandmothers and grandfathers of the
next century. Perhaps then they
will have more to tell their grandsons and granddaughters than liberty was worth $24 for the gold
and $7.50 for the silver.
Cl
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The Candor
Beyond Candor
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
I keep remembering two pieces
in the same issue of the New York
Times Book Review. Both dealt with
"loss."
One was by Alfred Kazin, about
James Agee, film critic and author
of Let Us Now Praise Famous Men.
Agee, who died at age 46, never
got over the loss of his father, who
died when James was six. A Death
in the Family is his book about the
trauma.
The second piece, a review of
Reynolds Price's latest novel, mentioned a pattern in Price's work. In
his novels are characters who feel
that right from the start they've lost
something that most other people
have: their own chance for innocence, childish delight, impunity.
The mothers of some of these persons have died giving birth to
them-sufficient reason to feel "as
if they are guilty from their first
breath."
Right now is the kindest season
in Dogwood, Virginia: October and
vigor. It's warm enough to eat outdoors under the trees, at Martha's

Charles Vandersee has returned to
Dogwood from Cazenovia, Tuscaloosa,
Knoxville, Evanston, Madison, and
Valparaiso.
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near the Univerity or at Zona Rosa
on the downtown mall, but you anticipate winter: concerts, plays, Advent hymns, waking up to the first
snow cover.
So "loss" is unusually perplexing
right now. Is it axiomatic that children deprived of a parent grow up
with a different outlook? Is Agee a
paridigm? I know people thus deprived, but it isn 't the sort of thing
one asks about. Do other lossesfortune, combat, faith, illusionleave permanent, painful scars?
These candid existential questions
appear only in plays and books.
For "real life," I fall back on intuition, and distrust the notion. It
seems simplistic and condescending
to think that loss makes a person a
citizen of a different, and drearier,
country.
Still, my own academic work is in
the humanities, and the humanities
have a long record of fascination
with loss. The humanities consider,
obviously, the human condition,
and in the West the fundamental
human condition, depicted largely
by men, is said to be loss. There
was once a state of Innocence, and
then a Fall. Or, a Golden Age and
then Decline. Or simple faith and
complex architecture, then Renaissance hubris, and then revolutions
and buildings burning.
This
is
a
caricature
but
humanists will recognize it. Odysseus lost his homeland, Job his
flocks, Lear his mind. The New
World has lost its passenger pigeons, bison, and clean air. Wordsworth described his "intimations of
immortality": he existed, before
birth, in a perfect world, and he
came into our world "trailing
clouds of glory," which he soon
lost.
Agee may not be a human
paradigm, but Wordsworth is a
humanist's paradigm. Thus in English-speaking literature the great
shock of Emerson and Whitman,
who consciously rejected the idea

of personal and historical loss. If
humankind has lost anything, they
asserted, it is the prison-house of
autocracy, bogus authority, stifling
convention, hopelessness, doom.
An invigorating loss, that we do
well to call gain.
Modern humanist critics admire
the work of Whitman and Emerson, but they do not endorse their
message. Walt and Waldo sound
too much like brash teenagers or
crass, beaming businessmen: the
moment's MTV, tomorrow's bottom line. Neither envisions the
hard, dark past, which is the iron
and zinc that make us durable.
Walt and Waldo are those funny
"transparent eyeballs" sitting on
luminous
mountaintops;
true
humanists scrounge below in the
troughs
for
ocean
garbage
Leviathan. Emerson, notoriously,
seemed undamaged by the death of
his young son; his existential behavior was consistent with his
philosophy.

Modern humanists admire
the work of Whitman and
Emerson, but they do
not endorse their
message. Walt and
W aldo sound too much
like brash teenagers.

It is true that since 1945 we have
a new entitlement to loss. At
Hiroshima and Nagasaki there
were clouds with the same shape as
a giant eyeball; we saw more lives
lost in less time than before. As
Robert Hass has put it, in a postwar
poem,
"Meditation
at
Lagunitas" (becoming an anthology
classic), "All the new thinking is
about loss."
Still, he says immediately: "In
this it resembles all the old thinking." But again, only humanists
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think this way-I think. That is,
"serious" poets, novelists, playwrights, artists; historians and
philosophers and theologians and
critics. So abundant you find them
without searching. Open a magazine; a poet of today, a woman, is
described as "good at elegy."
Eleanor Ross Taylor cherishes "a
vanishing rural culture" and deals
with "loss of faith in personal Immortality."
Ordinary human beings do not
talk about loss. Few people are ridden by nostalgia; most look forward to new projects, children and
children's children, Yellowstone
next summer.
But maybe loss is a taboo.
Perhaps in the West we all do
clutch secretly the feeling that existence is marred by omission. Only
it isn't the sort of thing we ask each
other about. When sex is cleansed
of the crust of taboo, possibly we
still will not confess to Phil
Donahue the sense that before we
ever made our plans for Yellowstone we had lost something
complete and great. A clockword
geyser and a vinyl tent-mere Plastic Age substitutes for the ineffable
and irretrievable. The rocks of the
ages are dissolved into sand.
However, I don't believe it. I
don't believe Lee lacocca and
Ronald Reagan and Robert Schuller feel in their souls, in some virgin corner unprowled by ghost
writers, speechwriters, or Emerson
Whitman Peale, a queasy sense of
walking on sand. Pop symbols,
these, for the dominant feeling in
the West. I do think professional
humanists feel shifting sand under
their feet much of the time, and
from this comes a strain and effort
at balance that makes for performance we admire. But does the typical citizen of Dogwood or Lake
Wobegon?
I don't know. One doesn't ask.
People seem resilient, but I don't
visit them at 3 a.m. So I seem to be
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looking more and more in life for
what I find so easily and rewardingly in literature: a candor beyond
candor.
It sounds absurd. Magazines candid about the way God constructed
the human body, its tetons and crevasses, are being pulled off the
shelves. People stop going to
church because "passing of the
peace" risks someone looking you
in the eye. People stop going to
movies because of "behavior that
belongs in the bedroom."

Maybe loss is a taboo.
Perhaps we all do clutch
secretly the feeling that
existence is marred by
omission. Only it isn't
the sort of thing we
ask each other about.

But what we call "candor" is
likely to be merely more information . Or being more "open" about
what we already know. You can call
me ''Mr." Humanist instead of
"Herr Professor Doktor." So-called
candor is phony; it has to do with
manners rather than with the
geothermal depths of one's being.
Even authentic testimony about
personal religious conversion is
notoriously bound by conventions.
So "candor beyond candor," by
contrast, has to present genuine individual human minds and feelings, in infinite detail. By persons
who have examined themselves
microscopically, and extruded to
great subtlety the language available to them. Beneath your manners and conventions, what are the
trace elements in your personal
bedrock? What minerals are those
sand crystals blowing in the wind?
When a human being rises up from
a major loss, is it more like rising
up from a bayonet in the chest, or

a hard wood floor in the face? Or
is it a different kind of thing, intangible, invisible, like the air inside
an oven?
Every Sunday, in the order of
Confession, I hear people say they
are "in bondage to sin." What verily do they express? How would
they put it in their own extruded
language? What is the sensation of
"bondage" that they feel? What
kind of freedom has been lost? Is
the word "bondage" a confession
that someone else has better language than they do, for a vague
discontent? Is it a prescription for
how one is supposed to feel, if one is
in a certain place at a certain time?
Is it, for some people, a puny
syllable for a suicidally constricting
agony?
My own humanistic expertise is
American literature and, by extension, the American mind; I think I
know it fairly well , and it strikes me
that search for the candor beyond
candor is a heroically difficult enterprise, in this nation and this era.
For probing, it will require a Studs
Terkel beyond any Studs Terkel
that Plato might have imagined.
Americans do not care for true
candor; they love its posturing, as
Europeans know , and they often
confuse candor with glib, sinless
confessions, noisy fatuities, and a
willingness to lose face for as much
as five minutes.
My notion of true revelation on
earth--candor beyond candorwould be watching a SuperTerkel
gently, sl-o-o-o-ow-ly, disarmingly,
with the finesse of an expert masseur and acupuncturist, investigate
the premises and reasoning and
experiential grounding of a typical
American Christian fundamentalist.
Start with that. Minute examination: cellular structure through
microphotography. No press conference frenzy, and no entrapment.
Just ask the questions that one just
doesn't ask. Do the same with an
unmilitantly agnostic professor of
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modern literature. The found and
the lost. Or, it may turn out, vice
versa. (Is , for humanists, loss more
a spur to imagination than a felt
condition?)

Not knowing the future,
no wonder we're phony
when seeming candid. In
the expression "Let it
all hang out," the word
all is phony. That's just
what doesn't hang out.

So what this so-called humanist
wants then is mere cheap entertainment? (Voyeur, he wants to watch
the inconsistencies we all live by
brought out glaring under a naked
bulb, so that like Sinclair Lewis in
Gopher Prairie and Zenith, he can
smirk and feel superior.) Well, not
quite. In fact, that itself is part of
the candor one wants to get
beyond. What news is it any longer
that each of us is a divided self? In
parochial school it was interesting
that Paul would do good but
couldn't; today, can any of us
stomach another sermon on the
subject?
John Adams, in his letters and
longwinded discourses, feared that
the American experiment was
doomed . Freedom would descend
into license-another Eden lost.
But in one passionate letter Eden
flourished . He said his was a war
generation. It made the next generation free for statecraft. Their
children would be free for commerce. The fourth generation finally would be free to study art,
music, letters-dearly for him, in
this passionate moment (and for all
true humanists) the ultimate good.
Candor compels me to ask, "Which
is the really real John Adams?"
(Candor beyond candor might respond: "If you will give me precise
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information about the future, I will
be able to tell you what I believe
right now.")
Not knowing the future, no wonder we're phony when seeming
candid. In the expression "Let it all
hang out," the word all is phony.
That is just what doesn't hang
out-the "all" that is the soul or the
inner being. This "all" we wish
were used when an individual
makes decisions and judgments,
shapes responses to works of art,
political speeches, and liturgical
formulations. The candor beyond
candor looks at whatever is most
candid and visible, on TV or in ordinary conversation, and suspects
it's a systematic con. But suspecting
a con isn't finding the "all."
So the abundance of professed
"loss" leads into a more or less predictable string of epistemological
and hermeneutical questions. And
we do know some of the answers.
People write about loss because
people write about loss; that is one
of them. As towns built bigger
cathedrals because other towns
were doing it. But Agee did not
write a whole book about his personal loss because it seemed to him
"the thing to do" ; nor is an Elie
Wiesel posturing when devoting a

life to the unfathomable loss called
the Holocaust.
I cringe when the vestments of
Robert Schuller quiver with the
sweeping gestures of power and
gain, but also I can't recite the formulas that express everything since
Eden as bondage. The cnt1c
Harold Bloom keeps insisting that
every new artist and writer feels
more sense of loss than his predecessors: loss of confidence because of "anxiety" over how to do
something really new. But is this so?
Fortunately, scholars and critics
have lost rather little hubris or
gumption. Indeed, I see ample
room for novelty-epistemological
and hermeneutical advances still to
be made, merely in distinguishing
more reliably good old phony
American candor from the candor
beyond candor. If we reported ourselves to one another, I suppose I
am curious as to what would chiefly
constitute the bedrock of our subsequent thinking. Would it be the
hot, tempestuous lava of our experiences and feelings, or would it
be language itself, chiseled in
forced labor under the prodding of
a relentless overseer/interviewer?
From Dogwood, yours faithfully,

Cl
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The Politics
Of the Sewer
Gail McGrew Eifrig
Government, we learned long
ago in social studies or intro to
political science classes, has many
forms. As a person more and more
skeptical and discouraged about
some of its major forms, I was interested to be a participant in government at its simplest level--one
might even be tempted to say its
"grass roots"-when our neighborhood began the process of organizing a sanitary sewer district.
A number of observations about
this experience might be useful
here, particularly if one bears in
mind that the major forms, the
federal government, for example,
ought to bear some resemblance to
minor ones. At least we ought to be
able to perceive some common
ground in the two manifestations
of the universal attempt to govern
with equity and justice.
We in the neighborhood did
realize that we were, in the matter
of sewers, experiencing anarchy.
Though old regulations had been
set up to insure that areas of poor
soil drainage should not have septic
systems, our neighborhood had ex-

panded anyway on a kind of compromise between laissez faire and
"what they don't know won't hurt
them." Everybody had tales to tell,
the horror stories that realtors
don't like to mention but that come
out when neighbors meet at property lines, turn off the mowers, and
trade miserable secrets about sump
pumps.
And you didn't need to be told;
evening walks on hot summer
nights could convince the most optimistic that something was wrong,
and it wasn't just one person's
problem. But, like many societies,
we were used to anarchy, and in
fact, had chosen it. After all, we
weren't residents of the town, we
were unincorporated, a wonderful
term that seems clearly to designate
a specific kind of political non-existence. Hoosiers on the whole seem
to enjoy political non-existence, or
at least I suppose that is the basis
on which we conduct some of our
elections.
But to return to the stench. It

was not true that we galvanized
ourselves into action. As a matter
of fact, it was an agency of the federal government that first had to
apprise, and then threaten us,
about our situation. We were bad
enough that the EPA itself took
notice. Truth would demand that
the august body was not strictly
concerned only with Indian Boundary and Brummitt Road, but was in
fact concerned with the entire region, all of whose water and soil
use is wrong. They now tell us. But
the problem was bad enough now
that some agency of government
would be invoked to turn us out of
our houses if we did not "do something."
Now it is interesting what happens to a group of people under
that kind of threat. Though we had
lived in the area for two years, we
had not really met any of our
neighbors. We had waved across
the road, and occasionally had exchanged incorrectly delivered mail,
but we had not been in each other's

grace before meals
nothing moves this morning
below the hill street of my mother's house
but seagulls
and the solitary milkman
the river shines
and babies sleep deeper than bulbs
beneath the snow
somehow
to a white tree by the river
an old robin returns
the milkman lifts his head to listen

Gail McGrew Eifrig teaches at Valparaiso University and writes regularly on
public affairs for The Cresset.
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presence, nor had we heard more
than a sentence or two of what anybody had to say. That changed. We
began to be called to meetings in
the local school cafeteria, and those
evenings were revelatory.
People talked in order to make
their experiences clear to others.
They confessed their fears of "incorporation," or of "more taxes,"
or of "being bossed around by the
big guys." They argued for their
points of view, they chose leaders,
they listened to and criticized experts. They chose a lawyer to advise them, and they treated him
amiably, but they acted as though it
was still their house, their money,
their
neighborhood,
and
he
shouldn't assume any authority
until it was specifically given.
In any of these meetings, there
were probably never more than
300 people (there are legally about
340 homeowners in the official district) but lots of them talked, and
all of them listened. They came
after long days in the office, or at
the mills, or in the classroom or
store, and they didn't go home
until somebody gave them the answers they were after.
Eventually all of this resulted in
the formation of an official body
with the right to levy a tax, a body
to which all of us belong simply by
location, but to which we all have
responsibilities. We have what I
suspect is the only sanitary district
in the country with a philosophy
professor as its official representative to local government. We hope
to be environmentally sound in a
year or two.
Now one of the things that occurs to me in thinking about this
episode is the vast difference between the interest we all displayed
in our sewers, and the indifference
so evident among the same people
when it comes to national affairs.
As I write this the Senate has just
passed another large bill guaranteeing American aid to the contras, but

30

not one person m my neighborhood has ever called a meeting to
discuss it. The cafeteria at Brummitt School sits empty, and all
around it people are doing their
ordinary things. They are mowing
lawns, and walking dogs, and jogging-but they're not talking to
each other about what our government has undertaken to do with
our futures in Central America.

I'm not suggesting that
the Senate vote on the
contras should have
waited until all the
neighborhood votes were
in. That participatory
no government can be.

I'm not suggesting that the Senate vote should have waited until
all the neighborhood votes were in.
That participatory a government
can never be. And we could not
possibly spend all our evenings discussing the balance of payments,
the national debt, and what to do
about Lebanon. (As Oscar Wilde
remarked with characteristic cynicism, and a considerable degree of
correctness, "The trouble with
socialism is that it takes too many
evenings.") But it does seem odd to
me that never-not one evening in
the year-do we gather to exchange ideas, experiences, arguments, fears, knowledge, preferences, and so on in the realm of
national concerns.
I am supposed to be content with
Newsweek's poll on the subject, and
to find that in the great national
norms my neighbors and I are represented. But I am not very happy
with that somehow. I would like to
know from Mr. Price or Mrs. Autry
themselves that they are willing for
us to pay for a war in Nicaragua.
Could we choose a kid out of the

Graham Woods subdivision to go
fight it?
It seems to me that a great deal
of our interest in the larger forms
of government is at the level of
People. We do discuss what senators
are doing in a gossipy way, and we
have enough curiosity about the
President's insides, or hairstyle, or
personality to mention these things
when the subject of "what the government is doing" comes up. But
about the actions these people are
taking, about the nature of their
votes, some of us are silent.
There must be some reason that
the polls keep showing that while
many people disagree with the specific actions Reagan has taken, they
consistently say that they agree with
the statement that he is "doing a
good job." Who are all these people
who agree that the economy is getting stronger, that Americans
should go to war, that there are no
hungry people in our country, that
minont1es
have
been
helped
enough, that the defense budget
should get bigger? I understand
that government has to happen by
means of compromise, and if I disagree with all those assertions just
made, then I have to argue, discuss, dispute, contend--change
minds to change policies. But
where are these minds to contend
with? Each of us is sitting at home,
watching a commentator tell us
what the polls say we think.
Maybe it's true what my daughter says-"It doesn't make any difference what you think, Mom,
they'll do what they want anyway."
So high school civics was wrong
after all, and far from being a republic based on representative vote,
we are a nation being managed
from the top. I keep hoping that
Americans might regain a sense of
themselves as citizens, but it doesn't
seem likely. Maybe before people
take on the task of governing
themselves, the smell just has to be
tl
a lot stronger.
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A Batty
Adventure
Dot Nuechterlein

Oh, terrific. This morning I
learned that in the past few days
four bats were killed in the hallways outside my office. You have
no idea what joy floods my heart at
the news.
Some longtime readers of this
page may recall that I don't have
much use for animals. Except for
giraffes-those
ungainly-graceful
quiet giants I can admire from
afar-my world would be perfectly
complete if it contained no non-humans whatsoever. (Please, no more
hate mail over this issue, no matter
how narrowminded and wicked
you consider my attitude.)
I am willing to concede that most
everyone else in the world likes the
entire animal kingdom, and I can
sort of understand a fondness for
puppies, kittens, goldfish, or cockatoos. But bats? Do they really,
truly add one whit (whatever that
is) to your existence? Should they
even have been created?
Of course it is impious to ques- ·
tion the Creator's wisdom in any
part of His handiwork. But I simply fail to see -the social utility of
bats, mosquitos, and other repulsive things, like rats and lizards. I
choose to believe that a kind and
loving God had His mind on more
important matters and just wasn't
paying close attention when He
said "Let there be," and they were.
I recall as a small child asking
why we have flies and bugs, and
being told that they were food for
other creatures. Some time later I
asked about nasties like toads and
crows, and learned that they are
October, 1986

part of the food chain, keeping the
bug population manageable. You
see the circular reasoning here?
Obviously we don't need any of
them.
I am particularly loathe to know
about the "nocturnal placental flying mammals with forelimbs modified to form wings" just beyond
my door because I once had the
horrendous experience of being
held prisoner inside my own office
by what was surely a crazed, vicious
member of that species. I do not
jest.
It was late on a hot, humid
Saturday evening one June. I regularly find myself in the office at
that hour, when no one is around
and the phone doesn't interrupt
my attempts at tunneling under the
debris on my desk.
My door was closed, but since it
didn't fit well in its ancient frame,
any movement in the hallway
brought a slight rattle. Gradually I
became aware that the door was
constantly vibrating: something was
moving out there in the corridor.
My building is located on the
edge of the campus adjacent to the
city's least desirable street addresses, those inhabited by students and
other slum dwellers. Friends always
warned me about the dangers of
working alone down there in the
small hours, and previously I
laughed at their concern. Ha.
While bravery is not my long
suit, in time I got curious as to
what type of man or beast had decided to come keep me company. I
cracked the door ever so narrowly-and there it was, a huge bat
swooping and careening up and
down, round and about. Don't give
me any of this "but bats are really
tiny" stuff; I know huge when I see
it. So I shut the door, determined
to wait it out. Surely the hateful
thing would tire and leave the
lighted passageway, to return to
whatever black hole it had come
from.

Wrong. Hours went by (well, at
least one) yet the bat flew on. I became convinced that it must be
rabid, and that venturing out into
its path would certainly result in severe damage to my person. What
to do? I thought of telephoning the
man in my life, but by this hour he
would be fast asleep, and besides, I
had our only car with me. Screaming out the window was pointless,
given the noise from the frat house
two blocks away.
Aha! The word fraternity did
present an idea. A friend, a former
student who was president of his
house, had introduced me to many
of his brothers. This was now summer session and most students were
gone, but I called that frat on the
chance someone would answer and
take pity. Luck was with me; I
explained my plight to the fellow
who said hello, and he agreed to
come and rescue me. Through the
window I would toss him an outside door key; he would make a lot
of noise opening the door, which
would scare away the bat long
enough for me to escape.
And that's what happened, except
that the student added his own little touch, one that made the entire
episode almost worthwhile. It was
wonderful. My knight in shining
armor found a buddy, and the two
of them came roaring down the
street on a motorcycle-brandishing pledge paddles! Mr. Bat didn't
have a chance, and scrammed as
they came charging in after him.
Surely no other damsel in distress,
before or since, has witnessed a
more delightful end to her misery.
So I guess I shouldn't worry
about the current crop of beasties
in the building, not as long as there
are gallant fraternity men around,
anyway. But I still don't like the
idea of something lurking about,
waiting to descend upon me. Let it
turn its radar vision in some other
direction , preferably m someone
else's belfry.
Cl
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For Good Reading
In a Glad New Year
In TimeFor Christmas
The herald angel~' song iS an ever- ·
lasting antiphony · ~ .. It moves down
the centuries above, beneath, and in
.the earth from Christmas to Christmas to Christmas . . . In it alone is
hope before death and after death ...
Their song lives to the 2,000th Christmas, to the 3,000th, and at length to
the last Christmas the world will see
. . . And on that final Christmas, as
on the first, the angels will know, as
we must know now, that the heart
which began to beat in Bethlehem still
beats in the world and for the world
... And for us ...
0 . P. Kretzmann
The Pilgrim
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Many years will pass before you understand Christmas . . . In fact, you
will never understand it completely
. . . But you can always believe in it,
always . . . The Child has come to
keep us company ... To tell us that
heaven is nearer than we had dared
to think . . . To put the hope of
eternity in our eyes . . . To tell us
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those who return to it . . . And you
will find with Him, I know, a happiness which you will never find
alone ...
0. P. Kretzmann
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